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Abstract 
The lack of a national comprehensive climate change policy in the United States has 
prompted cities to take the lead on urban sustainability actions. Extent research has explored 
various political, socio-economic and institutional factors to explain why some cities pursue 
sustainability actions and others do not. The role of organized interest groups – particularly 
business interest groups – is unclear as to whether their involvement correlates with more or less 
likelihood of sustainability policy adoption. The pluralist nature of the American political system 
suggests that various organized interests compete to advance their policy positions, and business 
interest groups have generally been theorized as economically rational profit-maximizers who 
would presumably oppose environmental regulation.  The overall rise in environmental 
awareness (Yale University and George Mason University, 2017) raises the possibility that 
business interest groups will support urban sustainability policies, as firm can be profitable while 
also limiting environmental impacts.  
This dissertation explores how various types of business interest groups effect the 
adoption of select urban sustainability policies that regulate the environmental impacts of 
buildings. My rationale for studying buildings is that urban sustainability is too broad of a 
concept to get at the nuances of interest group activity occurring in each sector, and distinctive 
business interest groups participate in urban policy processes depending on what sector is being 
regulated as many firms only work in one sector (e.g., buildings, transportation, water). Further, 
urban sustainability research commonly operationalizes business interest groups as one group 
which assumes a singular profit interest, but not all businesses respond to urban sustainability in 
the same way. I segment the business interest groups in an attempt to measure the effects of 
distinctive organized interests within a single industry – the construction industry. I generate 
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sector-specific business interest group data rather than relying on survey data or general proxies 
for business interests which are more common approaches in urban sustainability research. This 
work overcomes the issue with obtaining business interest group data in cities by using an 
algorithmic approach to data collection using the Python programming language for text mining 
industry association websites and member directories.  
Using various regression methods, my findings suggest that this approach to 
operationalizing interest groups has merit. The segmented business interest groups have 
divergent effects on the energy efficiency and green building policies with traditional 
construction interest groups having a negative effect on policy adoption while ‘green’ 
construction groups have a positive effect (Chapter 3 and Chapter 4). In Chapter 5, I explore the 
effects of organized interests on reported energy savings in published studies using a regression-
based meta-analysis approach. My results suggest that organized interests have an effect on 
reported energy savings, supporting a theory of advocacy bias in information sharing.  
On a theoretical level, this research contributes to understanding business interest groups 
in local urban policymaking in a low salience policy setting. It provides the insight that some 
segments of business interest groups are likely to have a positive effect on urban sustainability 
and environmental policy adoption while other segments are likely to have a negative effect, so it 
is important to segment business interest groups rather than treating them as one group with the 
same motivations. Also regarding theory, this work supposes that the buildings policy domain is 
low salience but it does attract political participants, albeit a narrowly focused group of technical 
professionals, which is divergent from some extent literature that suggests that low salience 
policy issues do not attract interest groups. Considering other urban sustainability sectors as low 
salience may be appropriate, as other areas may also attract groups of technical experts more so 
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than citizen groups. Methodologically, this research promotes algorithmic data collection as a 
way to overcome difficulties in collecting city-level data.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction and Study Overview 
Over the past few decades, local governments, businesses and citizen groups have been 
embracing urban sustainability as a fundamental concern, working towards alleviating some of 
the environmental pressures caused by urban activity, such as energy consumption and air 
pollution. In addition to addressing local environmental problems, American cities have 
immense opportunity to lessen the climate change problem globally as the United States is the 
second largest emitter of greenhouse gas emissions worldwide (US Environmental Protection 
Agency, 2017). Given the lack of a comprehensive national climate policy in the United States, 
cities have taken the lead on climate change mitigation through local sustainability policy 
adoption as well as promoting voluntary action among its business and citizens (Daley, Sharp 
and Bae, 2013; Krause, 2011; Sharp, Daley and Lynch, 2011). Since interest groups are an 
important part of the American political system (Dahl, 1961; Schumaker, 2013), their 
involvement in urban sustainability policy processes is expected to influence policy outcomes, 
such as the types of policies that are ultimately adopted in cities (Berry and Portney, 2013, 2014; 
Feiock, Portney, Bae, and Berry, 2014).  
While the openness of the political system enabling participation from groups with 
diverse interests is generally considered to be a positive characteristic of democracy, a perpetual 
threat is profit-seeking interest groups dominating over public interests (Berry, 1999; 
Kamieniecki, 2006; Kraft and Kamieniecki, 2007; Tocqueville, 1998). The overall rise in 
environmental awareness (Yale University and George Mason University, 2017) calls into 
question the likelihood for business interest groups to support public policies that protect public 
goods such as clean air and water, as the ability for a firm to be profitable and do so in a way that 
minimizes impacts on the environment is possible (Portney, 2013; Prakash, 2000, Press and 
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Mazmanian, 2006). Not all businesses will pursue the path of environmental responsibility, so 
examining the effects of business interest groups on environmental policy necessitates the ability 
to segment business interest groups according to their distinctive motivations. 
Operationalizing Business Interest Groups in Urban Policy Research 
Throughout this research I explore the effects of two types of organized interest groups – 
traditional construction industry representatives and ‘green’ business professionals - on policy 
processes. The traditional building association is associated with the desire for urban 
development and city growth for profit gains (Logan and Molotch, 1988; Molotch, 1976), 
supported by the classical economic viewpoint of firms’ profit maximization objectives (Coase, 
1937) and political economic theory of firms as political coalitions colluding to resolve political 
conflicts (March, 1962). From the perspective of interest group pluralism, competition among 
firms within the same industry is probable. Some industrial groups are expected to oppose 
environmental regulation due to concentrated costs and diffuse benefits for group members but 
environmental interests are expected to be deliberated by policymakers in a pluralist setting 
(Scruggs, 2003). Fundamentally, both ‘green’ and traditional construction industry members 
seek profits in the construction industry. A core difference in the conceptualization of the two 
groups is that traditional construction industry members have more interest in enhancing “profits 
by 'externalizing' environmental impacts" (Morrison and Roht-Arriaza, cited in Schindler, 2010, 
p. 329) whereas ‘green’ construction industry members intentionally seek to limit negative 
externalities, and may even ‘internalize’ some costs associated with the protection of public 
goods.  
Segmenting business interest groups within a single economic or industrial category at 
the city level has been difficult due to limited data sources that are consistent across cities, a 
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prerequisite for quantitative analysis. Consequently, urban policy scholars have resorted to either 
creating proxies for business interest group presence, such as counts of manufacturing 
establishments, or administering surveys for data collection. Given the rough approximation of 
the former approach and relatively low response rates in the latter approach, I take an algorithmic 
approach to data collection using member directories for industry associations to construct a 
dataset of counts of interest group members per city. An issue with the typical measurement 
approaches is the tendency to treat business interest groups as homogeneous when, in fact, 
business interests within a city can vary dramatically. To explore this variation within an interest 
group, I select distinctive industry associations within the construction industry.  
Environmental Impacts of Buildings as a Low Salience Policy Issue 
My choice to examine the construction industry is motivated by an interest in low 
salience policy issues to capture the technical nature of many urban sustainability policy areas. 
Nonetheless, this is an important policy area as major financial gains are at stake given that 
construction and real estate industries account for over 15 percent of the U.S. gross domestic 
product (U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2017). Low salience policy areas are typically 
characterized by low levels of public attention, instead attracting the engagement of technical 
experts. The extent to which insights from extent interest group scholarship – which is mostly 
national in scope and focuses on high salience issues – applies to a technical urban policy issue is 
unknown. How firms gather into interest groups to gain profit maximization or assemble to 
support public interests may depend on issue salience.  
On an applied level, this research adds depth to the collective understanding of the types 
of groups that are participating in urban sustainability policy processes while analyzing 
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organized interest groups in a highly technical sector of urban sustainability - buildings. 1 
Buildings account for 12 percent of the U.S. greenhouse gas emissions portfolio (US 
Environmental Protection Agency, 2017) and 40 percent of demand-side energy consumption 
(U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2017). 2 Building energy codes and green building 
programs are two of the most common public policies that regulate buildings and their 
components (Erickson, Lazarus, Chandler and Schultz, 2013), thus are focal policies for this 
research. To date, sustainability research has ordinarily examined policy activity in an aggregate 
fashion, grouping initiatives from multiple sectors together to better understand why some 
governments pursue sustainability, and others do not.  While this provides valuable insight, as 
the field of inquiry grows, it is important to more deeply explore specific sectors to better 
understand decision-making.  The actor groups that are responsible for many aspects of the 
policy processes are overlooked because they are sector-specific (Koski, 2010). This research 
adds a building block to sectoral research intended to be nested within broader sustainability 
research. Building codes and green building programs in particular hold considerable promise for 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions, and yet, the politics and interest group mobilization is 
understudied. The importance of the public policy domain governing the built environment is 
                                                
1 In 1980, the U.S. had approximately 3.8 million commercial buildings while the most recent 
estimate in 2012 reported 5.6 million commercial buildings (U.S. Energy Information 
Administration, 2015, 2017). Similarly, in 1980 the U.S. had only 88 million housing units, 
growing to over 135 million housing units in 2016 (U.S. Census Bureau, 1990, p. 6; 2017). 
2 Many researchers mispresent the impact of the built environment, portraying that transportation 
is responsible for over 30 percent of the impact, residential and commercial buildings at less than 
20 percent, and electricity at over 30 percent. Actually, a portion of the electricity pie piece is 
attributed to electric demand from buildings. The residential/commercial distinction only 
captures end use fuel, such as natural gas, oil, wood and propane.   
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evident given the financial gains at stake and need to regulate environmental impacts from 
construction. 
Research Roadmap 
This dissertation examines the power of interest groups in driving green and energy 
efficient building in cities as mechanisms to achieve their sustainability goals. In Chapter 2, I 
explore the core tenets of interest group scholarship and urban sustainability policy context as it 
relates to the buildings policy domain. In Chapters 3, 4, and 5, I present three empirical studies 
that ask multiple interrelated questions to explore interest group theories within the paradigm of 
policy adoption research and the role of interest groups in shaping information about policy 
effectiveness. The following research questions are explored across the three empirical chapters:   
• How do organized interest groups affect sustainability policy adoption when the policy 
option imposes concentrated costs to businesses? Specifically, what are the effects of 
traditional and ‘green’ industry member associations on policy adoption for green and 
energy efficient privately-owned buildings?   
• How do organized interest groups affect policy adoption when the policy enables 
concentrated benefits and diffused costs to businesses? Specifically, what are the effects 
of traditional and ‘green’ industry member associations on mandates for energy efficient, 
publicly-owned buildings?  
• Is there an advocacy bias in green building energy consumption analysis? 
The first empirical chapter, “Segmenting the Construction Industry: A Quantitative Study 
of Business Interest Groups in a Low Salience Policy Setting”, explores a low salience policy 
issue to examine the influence of distinct segments of business interest groups on local policy 
decisions. I analyze the effects of two types of organized interest groups – traditional 
construction and green building association members - on the adoption of building energy codes, 
the policies that govern the energy efficiency of buildings. I use logistic regression modeling to 
estimate the probability of code stringency given differences in the presence of trade association 
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members in cities while controlling for demographic, social, and political factors. I find that the 
traditional building interest group has a negative effect on the odds of a city’s energy code 
adoption compared to the positive effects of the green builder interest group.  
The second empirical chapter, “How Business Interest Groups Matter: Rare Events 
Modeling of Green Building Policy Adoption in Cities”, examines a specific type of business 
interest group – construction industry associations - involved in the green building policy arena 
to understand their effects on policy adoptions. Using rare events logit modeling, I estimate the 
effects of ‘traditional’ and ‘green’ industry associations on green building policy adoption while 
controlling for political, socio-economic and problem severity characteristics of cities. The 
results indicate that, not surprisingly, the presence of green industry association members 
increase the likelihood of local policy adoption. However, the traditional industry associations do 
not limit the probability of green building policy adoption as expected.  
The third empirical chapter, “Interest Groups, Policy Impacts, and Advocacy Biases”, 
investigates the information that is published by organized interests in the context of the green 
building program, Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED). I test two 
competing hypotheses – advocacy bias and interest group professionalism – to identify if there is 
systematic variation across published studies on energy savings from LEED-certified buildings. 
Using a meta-regression methodology, I find that studies that have an environmental 
organization as the primary author are likely to report higher levels of energy savings from 
LEED buildings when compared to studies that have government agencies or universities as the 
primary author.     
Across the three studies, I find that organized interest groups have a significant effect on 
local sustainability policy adoption. The effect varies depending on the relevance of the interest 
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group to the specific policy. Segmenting the construction industry into ‘traditional’ and ‘green’ 
categories and testing two different case selections – building energy codes and LEED green 
building standards – helps to affirm the importance of considering nuances of the business 
interest group and policy type. For example, traditional builder interest groups are highly 
influenced by building energy code policies, as these policies set the minimum standards for 
construction. Green builder interest groups are likely to be less affected by building energy 
codes, as presumably they are already building to higher construction standards. The green 
builder interest group is heavily intertwined with green building policy adoptions, as these policy 
advancements could secure more of the construction market for their members. The traditional 
builder interest group is less concerned with green building policy adoptions, as these policies 
are commonly for public buildings only or adopted on a voluntary basis. The traditional builders 
do not have to participate in the green building market as long as green building standards do not 
become minimum requirements for all construction. These interest group dynamics are also 
observed when it comes to measuring energy impacts from the LEED program. Organized 
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Chapter 2 Review of Literature on Business Interest Groups and Urban Sustainability 
Policy 
 The American political system is relatively open to interest group influences compared to 
many other governments around the world (Scruggs, 2003; Tocqueville, 1998). This is generally 
considered a normatively positive characteristic of a democratic government, yet not without 
potential issues such as capture by corporate interests and other elite (Mills, 1956). The effects 
that business interest groups have on urban sustainability policy adoption at the local level is 
unclear, as some studies discover that business interest groups have positive effects on policy 
adoption while the economic theory of rationality and profit maximization of firms suggests that 
business interest groups will oppose regulation, particularly regulation that has cost burdens to 
industry (Kamieniecki, 2006; Kraft and Kamieniecki, 2007). This chapter explores these 
theoretical foundations and applicability to urban sustainability policy.    
Openness of the American Political System  
Scholars have been negotiating boundaries for the subfield of interest group scholarship 
within political science and policy studies. Emphases of various aspects of interest groups – such 
as group politics, structure, membership, internal group dynamics, strategies and roles in the 
policy process and political system at large – are found within the sprawling collections of works 
on interest groups in America. A few dominant lines of inquiry are apparent, including multiple 
generations of research testing theories of pluralism, or the idea that citizens assemble into 
groups to pressure policymakers to pursue their democratic ideals in competition with other 
prevailing interest groups (Dahl, 1961). Challenges to pure pluralist theories include ‘biased 
pluralism,’ such as elite (Mills, 1956) and regime theories (Stone, 1989) that explain how 
affluent citizens or business leaders effectively sway political processes, and ‘majoritarian 
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pluralism’ (e.g., median voter theory, Downs, 1957) that emphasizes the influence of the 
electorate (popular vote) (Gilens and Page, 2014). Pluralism, in its purest sense, conceptualizes 
group participation in the political system as having a normatively positive effect on society, 
since participation is characteristic of an open and responsive democratic government (Berry, 
1999; Kamieniecki, 2006). This is contrary to concerns of tyranny of the majority, which asserts 
that people must be controlled so that they do not overpower government or less powerful 
citizens (Madison, 1787). Generally, groups organize around certain issue areas that affect them 
or affect something that they are ideologically interested in (Lowi, 1979). 
Another school of thought on the political participation of interest groups is 
neocorporatism. Neocorporatism is a structural theory of political participation whereby 
businesses and governments have a strong relationship absent the influence of public interest 
groups (Kraft and Kamieniecki, 2007; Scruggs, 2003). Compared to the pluralist school of 
thought, neocorporatism suggests a more subservient role of businesses to government, with 
governments in the top hierarchal position. While pluralism is thought to be more explicable of 
interest group activity in the United States, neocorporatist theory contributes to the 
understanding of consensual activities between governments and businesses, such as technical 
guidance provided by business experts for policy issues (Fiorino, 2011, p. 379).    
Despite the longstanding collection of interest group scholarship, some outstanding 
questions, methodological issues, and clarifications have been articulated by contemporary 
scholars, including the lack of an overarching framework or set of theories for interest groups 
(Baumgartner and Leech, 1998; Berry, Portney, Liss, and Simoncelli, 2006); exploring the 
alignment between national, state, and urban interest group theories (Berry, 2010; Berry et al., 
2006; Berry and Portney, 2014; Maisel and Berry, 2012); and methodologically, how to identify 
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interest groups, their resources, strategies, and effects on policy processes (Berry et al., 2006; 
Kraft and Kamieniecki, 2007, p. 24).  
As a field of study, interest group research throughout the 20th century consistently asked 
a common central question still being asked today: to what extent is the policymaking process 
shaped and controlled by elites, other organized interest groups, and average citizens? Credited 
with major advancements in mid 20th century research Dahl (1961), while examining public 
education, urban redevelopment and political party nominations, finds broader patterns of 
political participation than wealthy power elites as Mills (1956) had suggested. While Dahl’s 
perspective provides an optimistic outlook on American democracy, other scholars emphasize 
the power of big business that overshadows representation of citizen’s values in the democratic 
process (e.g., Lowi, 1979; Schattschneider, 1975; Stone, 1989). Further, many citizen’s interests 
remain unorganized and unrepresented, never having the chance to reach a policy agenda (Olson, 
1965; Schattschneider, 1975). This debate on who gets involved and what effect participation has 
on policy processes is an eternal concern in interest group scholarship. Currently, much of the 
interest group scholarship explores nuances of organized interests specific to the level of 
government from national to state to regional to local (Berry, 2010; Portney and Berry, 2016) in 
particular issue areas or sectors such as public health or environmental issues (Ball, 2012; Berry 
and Portney, 2013; Prakash, 2000) and in the context of assorted political, institutional, and 
economic factors (Gillens and Page, 2014). While extent research has been building towards 
greater clarity on interest groups, modern-day circumstances call for a more nuanced 
understanding of interest group dynamics and even challenges to old ways of thinking.  
The various approaches to interest group studies reflect discernable differences in 
definitions of the unit of analysis. That is, while individual researchers study ‘groups’, their 
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definition of group may be incongruous. Baumgartner and Leech (1998) capture the assortment 
of units of analyses in interest group research:  
“All in all, one can note at least the following types of definitions [of interest groups] 
used by various scholars interested in the roles of interest groups in politics: social or 
demographic categories of the population, membership organizations, any set of 
individuals with similar beliefs, identifications, or interests; social movements; lobbyists 
registered in legislatures; political action committees; participants in rule-making or 
legislative hearings; institutions, including corporations and government agencies; 
coalitions of organizations and institutions; prominent individuals acting as political 
entrepreneurs or lobbyists. The diversity of definitions represents and underlying 
diversity of theoretical concerns” (p. 29).  
Overall, “some defining characteristics of interest groups include interacting with and/or 
attempting to influence government” (Baumgartner and Leech, 1998, p. 24-25). This definition is 
almost identical to the one adopted by Berry and Wilcox (2009): “On the simplest level, when 
we speak of an interest group, we are referring to an organization that tries to influence 
government” (p. 5). This dissertation adopts the following definition of interest group: a 
membership organization that attempts to influence government.   
Urban Sustainability Policy and Business Interest Groups 
Green and energy efficient building policies are types of policy tools that facilitate the 
implementation of urban sustainability goals (May and Koski, 2007). Because these policies 
directly impact major industries, construction and real estate industry representatives actively 
engage in policy processes that regulate buildings and land development (Feiock, Portney, Bae, 
and Berry, 2014). While business engagement is predicted to lead to positive policy outcomes in 
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some cases (Wang, Hawkins, and Lebredo, 2012) such as goal-setting and mandates for public 
facilities, interest groups remain divided on many aspects of sustainability, including building 
code advancement that inherently imposes cost burdens on the construction industry.  
Indeed, the construction industry and citizens alike generally support cost-efficient urban 
growth for personal gain and improved quality of life (Molotch, 1976; Feoick et al., 2014), as 
people want to live near environmental amenities such as beach fronts even though location 
choice may not be in the public interest from an environmental and economic perspective 
(Lubell, Feiock, and De La Cruz, 2009). From this viewpoint, builders are simply fulfilling buyer 
demand while maximizing their profits in line with the “sustainability paradox,” which posits 
that wealthier communities may be more environmentally conscious but also demand more and 
larger homes that inherently use more natural resources (Lubell et al., 2009).  
Because some businesses have specialized in ‘green’ development particularly in select 
urban markets, research in this area has highlighted business support in environmental policy 
processes (e.g., May and Koski, 2007; Portney and Berry, 2016). Some contemporary 
neopluralists emphasize that individuals participate in policy processes because they are driven 
by ideology and not simply motivated by costs and benefits (Berry et al., 2006; Schumaker, 
2013). However, those industry members who appear to be ideologically motivated may be 
acting strategically to be successful in a distinctive market segment. The optimistic perspective 
that the construction industry has been ‘greened’ is challenged by the idea that industry members 
may be seeking market differentiation; these industry members may not necessarily be motivated 
by ideological commitments to environmental sustainability, but rather rent and sales premiums 
from green building (Gripne, Martel, and Lewandowski, 2012). The construction industry has 
been criticized for “greenwashing”, or promoting a symbolic image that supports environmental 
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ideals, but with questionable substantive actions to this end (Prakash, 2000; Press and 
Mazmanian, 2006; Robbins, 2001). Further, more traditional business members who are agnostic 
about green development ideals are still actively engaged in local policy processes and likely 
have a strong effect in most urban markets. Exploring this complex situation can reveal insights 
into the ways in which industry-oriented interest groups influence energy efficient building and 
land use development.     
In a separate line of inquiry, Koski (2010) characterizes green building as a low salience 
policy issue that is technical, complex, and does not engage a myriad of interest groups. Koski 
suggests that “knowledge brokers” who translate complex technical information between experts 
and policymakers are more commonly active in low salience policy areas than interest groups. 
However, these knowledge brokers have “a specific interest in seeing a policy prevail” (p. 97) 
and “Knowledge brokers can engage in tasks akin to more traditional interest groups as 
champions for specific policy solutions” (p. 97), which creates some fuzziness between the 
definition boundaries of knowledge brokers and interest group members. In theorizing about 
differences in national and local interest groups, Berry and Portney (2014) argue that low levels 
of regulation compared to national levels make it so business interest groups are relatively 
inactive, except, they note, in the areas of land use where “developers, construction firms, and 
business trade councils” mobilize (p. 27). Indeed, some urban sustainability and climate change 
policy areas are technical and complex, engaging only a few interest groups in the policy 
processes relative to other high salience policy areas. Further, the interest groups often have a 
professional representative who represents the organization’s (and member’s) policy positions 
collectively. It would be remiss to think that interest groups are not active in urban sustainability 
policy processes because of their low salience because indeed, interest group presence is 
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observed in green building and energy code policy processes, albeit highly technical and 
professional.  
Research Gaps 
The effects of business interest groups on urban sustainability policy adoption remains 
unclear (Berry and Portney, 2013; Feiock, Portney, Bae, and Berry, 2014; Kamiencki, 2006; 
Kraft and Kamiencki, 2007; Potoski and Woods 2002; Prakash, 2000). Some studies conclude 
that business interest groups have effects on policy processes (e.g., Jenner et al., 2012) while 
other studies find no statistically significant effect (e.g., Berry and Portney, 2013; Deslatte and 
Swann, 2016). The discrepancies could be partially attributed to the aforementioned issues, such 
as different ways that researchers operationalize interest group presence, level of analysis of the 
study, or policy area.  
For example, Berry and Portney (2013, 2015) found that the inclusion of business groups 
in deliberations had no statistically significant effect on policy adoption but environmental group 
involvement did have an effect in both studies. Similarly, in a study on a mix of energy policy 
tools, Deslatte and Swann (2016) found that neither environmental groups nor developers had a 
statistically significant effect on selecting energy policy tool bundles, but when modeling single 
policy tools for green construction and land use, environmental groups had statistical 
significance while developers did not. Business interest groups are expected to matter to urban 
policy adoption, so more research is needed to understand what explains the variation of effects 
across studies.  
In general, contemporary urban policy processes tend to be more cooperative than 
conflicted, especially issues with low salience that are highly technical and complex such as 
green building and building energy policies (Gormley, 1986; Koski, 2010). In such situations, 
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organized groups negotiate and bargain among the group of technical experts, often approaching 
policymakers with a cohesive proposal developed through a stakeholder engagement process 
facilitated by government staff or non-governmental organizations (Berry, 2010; May and Koski, 
2007; Schumaker, 2013). This may cause policy preferences of oppositional interest groups to 
appear convergent, which may mispresent the effect size of interest groups.3  
Contributing to the set of theories for interest groups, this research explores the impact of 
divergent interest groups on local government decision making, particularly when interest groups 
within the same business category diverge on policy issues despite facing similar potential costs 
and benefits. I explore the interplay between motivations by ideology and profit. Indeed, multiple 
scholars have recognized the need to categorize differences between actors within business 
groups – such as traditional and ‘green’ construction industry actors – to gain a better 
understanding of interest groups effects on policy processes (e.g., Portney, 2009; Sharp, Daley, 
and Lynch, 2011, p. 438).  
This approach was pursued by Jenner, Chan, Frankenberger, and Gabel (2012) who did 
not only study the effects of industry-oriented interest groups on renewable energy policies, but 
also separated the industry interest groups into sustainability-oriented solar energy association 
members and conventional energy utility association members. Jenner et al. (2012) found the 
effects of sustainability-oriented interest group to be 1.33-3.77 in relative odds of Renewable 
Portfolio Standards policy adoption and the conventional energy utility interest group ranging 
from -0.24 - 0.67 in relative odds. These results suggest that significant differences can be found 
when separating industry groups into more nuanced categories. This methodological approach 
                                                
3 Along these lines, Lubell, Feiock and Handy (2009) test the theory that “interest groups with 
pro-environmental attitudes will counterbalance development interests.” 
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offers a refinement of understanding the effects of industry-oriented interest groups on policy 
processes.  
Most other studies use only one all-encompassing variable to represent industry groups, 
which is more common in policy studies. However, it is important to recognize that business or 
industrial interest groups are not homogenous. Analyzing business groups in a single category 
fails to discern the ideological spectrums that exist within and across interest groups. There is 
complexity in interest group composition, and it is important to understand how these diverse 
interests – albeit within the same economic or industrial category – operate in an important 
policy area – sustainability policy.  
This dissertation builds on extent research in political science, economics and policy 
studies fields. Interest group scholarship and micro-economic theory provides a theoretical 
foundation to explore the effects of business interest groups on urban sustainability policy 
adoption in one specific sector – buildings. Extent literature on the effects of business interest 
groups on sustainability policy adoption is varied – finding a mix of positive and negative effects 
- partially due to differences in definitions of interest groups, the types of policies, and the levels 
of government being researched. This work attempts to add insights into these aspects of urban 
sustainability literature.  
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Chapter 3 Segmenting the Construction Industry: A Quantitative Study of Business 
Interest Groups in a Low Salience Policy Setting 
 
Abstract: This study explores a low salience policy issue to examine the influence of distinct 
segments of business interest groups on local policy decisions drawing from two competing 
theoretical angles - private and public interest group theory. It analyzes the effects of two types 
of organized interest groups – traditional construction and green building association members - 
on the adoption of building energy codes, the policies that regulate the energy efficiency of 
buildings. Logistic regression is used to explain the probability of code stringency given 
differences in the presence of trade association members in cities while controlling for 
demographic, social, and political factors. The outcome of this research is an estimate of effects 
of traditional and ‘green’ interest groups on local building energy code policies. This research 
finds that the traditional building interest group members have a greater negative effect on the 
odds of a city’s energy code adoption compared to the green builder interest group.  
 
Keywords: urban policy, microeconomics, business influence, building codes, sustainability 
Introduction 
Commercial and residential buildings are responsible for approximately 12 percent of the 
U.S. greenhouse emissions portfolio (US Environmental Protection Agency, 2017). While the 
environmental impact of buildings is a central concern for environmental sustainability and 
climate change mitigation (Williams et al., 2012), the buildings policy domain is rarely studied 
as it is considered low salience and researchers tend to focus on higher salience situations (Go, 
2016; Koski, 2010). Low salience policy issues are generally characterized by low levels of 
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political participation and public attention (Koski, 2010). These issue arenas can attract interest 
groups, but tend to engage a narrowly focused group of technical professionals, such as industry 
associations (Koski, 2010, p. 96). Patterns of power, influence and collusion of business interest 
groups in low salience urban policy settings are distinct from other issue arenas that attract 
widespread attention appealing to personal beliefs, such as immigration or gay rights. It is 
unknown how insights from the body of interest group scholarship, focused mostly on high 
salience issues, translates to low salience policy arenas at the local level. The extent to which 
firms assemble into groups to pursue profit maximization or assemble to promote public interest 
- an interplay of classical economic theory and neocorporatism – may depend on issue salience.  
This research explores this interplay by analyzing the effects of two types of organized 
interest groups – traditional construction industry representatives and ‘green’ business 
professionals - on building energy code adoptions at the local level. It asks, what are the effects 
of traditional and ‘green’ industry member associations on building energy code policy 
adoption?  The traditional developer community is associated with a pro-development ideology 
justifying urban growth for personal gain (Logan and Molotch, 1988; Molotch, 1976), in line 
with the classical economic viewpoint of the firm as a profit maximizer (Coase, 1937) and 
political economic theory of how firms form political coalitions towards the goal of resolving 
political conflicts (March, 1962). Interest group pluralism suggests that firms will compete with 
similar established groups within the same industry, such as green construction interest groups, 
and ultimately oppose environmental regulation that imposes cost burdens and diffuse benefits to 
the firm (Scruggs, 2003). Contrastingly, green developers are associated with the neocorporatist 
theory that some firms act in the public interest on behalf of government (Kraft and Kamieniecki, 
2007; Scruggs, 2003). These firms often ‘float’ the burden of added costs to construct buildings 
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according to stringent environmental standards, meaning that the green construction firm absorbs 
the incremental cost during the construction process and the extent to which the consumer will 
absorb the cost is seemingly uncertain.  
Segmenting actors within an industrial group – such as traditional and ‘green’ 
construction industry actors – is intended to deepen the understanding of diverse business 
interest groups effects on sustainability policy adoption at the local level, an endeavor that has 
been requested in past research (e.g., Portney, 2009; Sharp, Daley, and Lynch, 2011, p. 438). 
Extent literature has recognized that business interest groups are not homogenous and diversity 
of business interest groups has been largely explored through surveys (e.g., Berry and Portney, 
2013), yet business interest group diversity has not been tested much in a quantitative way. Many 
scholars tend to consider business interests with respect to environmental policy as always 
pursuing deregulation (e.g., Kamieniecki, 2006, p. 53), yet some industry professional groups 
might support regulations that are in the public interest, or in favor of their own market 
differentiation and growth.  Bringing more clarity and precision to understanding this 
empowered group of stakeholders is important, accomplished by bridging microeconomic 
theories of firms, interest groups scholarship and urban policy research. Analyzing business 
groups in a single category, as typically done in urban policy research, fails to discern the 
motivational spectrum that exist within and across interest groups. There is more complexity in 
interest group composition than commonly realized, and it is important to understand how these 
diverse interests, albeit within the same economic or industrial category, operate in an important 
policy area.   
This study proceeds as follows. In the theory section, I explore conditions under which 
business interest groups are expected to support or oppose environmental regulations and review 
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empirical findings from relevant extent research leading to three hypotheses. Next, I provide 
background information on building energy codes to orient the reader to the case selection. In the 
research design section, I provide descriptions of the variables and expectations on how the 
variables relate to policy adoption, mostly drawing from urban sustainability research. Next, I 
provide results from logistic regression modeling and exponentiate the coefficients into odds 
ratios for easier interpretation of the model. I conclude the study with a discussion of the 
modeling results as it relates to broader explanations of interest group activity and cities’ actions 
on policy adoption, ending with the article’s contribution to urban sustainability literature.  
Theory and Hypotheses 
Multiple theories generate expectations of how business interest groups will act in policy 
adoption settings. These theories commonly address the motivations of business interest groups, 
and predict divergent outcomes in support or opposition of environmental policy depending on 
the group’s motivations (Table 3-1). The classical economic perspective that businesses are 
comprised of executives who are rational profit-maximizers underlies the idea that private firms 
will oppose environmental regulation because regulation is perceived to limit profits from 
industrial development (Kamieniecki, 2006; March, 1962). However, recent discussions have 
posed that many private sector actors are irrational in an economic sense guided by the desire of 
individuals and groups to act for the common good (e.g., Portney, 2013; Portney and Berry, 
2016). These divergent perspectives have been broadly labeled as private and public interest 
group theories (see Jenner et al., 2012). Private interest group theory expects that industry-
oriented interest groups will oppose environmental regulation in the interest of personal gain 
while the public perspective offers the viewpoint for support of environmental regulation in the 
interest of common welfare.  
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[Insert Table 3-1 Here] 
Private Interest Group Theory  
With interest groups conceptualized as “any set of individuals with similar beliefs, 
identifications, or interests” (Baumgartner and Leech, 1998, p. 29), the traditional economic 
perspective proposes that economically rational individuals seek to maximize their positions in 
society (Berry and Wilcox, 2009, p. 64). Some individuals join interest groups as leverage to 
improve their position. Economically rational and politically strategic individuals will work to 
advance policy alternatives where their benefits are concentrated for self-interest and costs are 
diffused to other members of society (Olson, 1965). Along this line of reasoning, energy efficient 
building mandates are expected to foster opposition from the construction industry as the 
incremental construction costs are incurred by the construction professional (Deslatte and 
Swann, 2016, p. 584; Wilms, 1982, p. 555). In the ‘split incentive’ case when the builder incurs 
the costs but others receive the benefits, the benefits of energy codes are granted to the buildings’ 
buyers in terms of lower building operating costs, tenants who enjoy increased building occupant 
comfort, and society at large who benefits from lesser environmental impacts (Sun et al, 2016, p. 
3). Construction professionals are not expected to support such scenarios as it would be 
financially disadvantageous to the builder. Generally, construction professionals are expected to 
collude within an interest group towards the common goal of supporting policies that favor 
growth and development and minimize financial losses to the business (Feiock, Tavares and 
Lubell, 2008; Logan and Molotch, 1988; March, 1962; Molotch, 1976, p. 311).  
May and Koski (2007) found that interest groups opposing energy efficient mandates had 
three times stronger influence than interest groups supporting the mandates (p. 59).  In the study, 
May and Koski (2007) surveyed state homebuilder associations, national building code 
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organizations, professional architect organizations and other groups involved in building energy 
advocacy about their influence, measured by asking whether they supported, opposed or were 
not involved in the policy adoption process for energy efficient mandates (May and Koski, 2007, 
p. 57).  
H1 (Oppositional): Higher numbers of traditional construction industry interest group 
members per capita are likely to limit the probability of the adoption of energy efficient 
mandates that apply to privately-owned buildings and development projects. 
Public Interest Group Theory  
As economic rationality failed to explain cooperation among actors in otherwise 
competitive environments, behavioral theories of rational choice emerged to argue that 
individuals within groups are less economically rational than Olson (1965) and other interest 
group analysts had assumed (Berry et al., 2006; Ostrom, 1990, 1998; Schattschneider, 1975). 
Berry et al. (2006) express,  
“… the initial theory, popularized by Mancur Olson, badly underestimated the propensity 
of individuals to be, in economists’ jargon, “irrational.” That is, Americans have proven 
that they are all too willing to join organizations that command tangible costs, such as 
volunteer time or financial contributions, but offer ideological rather than material 
rewards… their work tended to be more ideological than self-interested” (p. 11) 
Along these lines, Ostrom (1990) had found that in some situations, people naturally organize to 
manage common pool resources in support of local public goods. The extent to which this line of 
reasoning applies to firms is unknown. Some construction professionals might support new 
building codes to better provision public goods for their clients and society in terms of cleaner air 
resulting from energy use reduction in buildings and selection of cleaner fuel sources for 
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buildings. While their motivations may partially be self-interested in attempt to secure business 
from clients who demand cleaner buildings, green building construction professionals and their 
associated interest groups are still supporting codes that, in effect, protect common pool 
resources. 
 In the area of corporate environmental responsibility asking why some firms embrace 
environmental initiatives while others do not in, Bansal and Roth (2000) identify regulatory 
compliance, economic opportunities, stakeholder pressures and ethical concerns as key 
motivations. Multiple studies find that stakeholder pressures are the most important determinant, 
as clients and investors call for environmental protection (e.g., Darnall, Potoski and Praskash, 
2009; González-Benito and González-Benito, 2006). Firms can garner a positive reputation 
through their support of environmental initiatives, creating a competitive edge for the company 
(Bansal and Roth, 2000, p. 724). Determining which motivational factor is most prevalent in the 
green construction industry is beyond the scope of this study, but we can assume that an 
interaction of the aforementioned motivations, including market differentiation, stakeholder 
responsiveness and ethical motivations, inspires construction firms to operate in the green 
building market.   
H2 (Supportive): Higher numbers of green construction industry interest group members 
per capita are likely to increase the probability of the adoption of energy efficient 
mandates that apply to privately-owned buildings and development projects. 
Counterbalanced Opposition and Support 
Orthodox pluralism conceptualized urban policymaking as engagement among diverse 
ethnic, racial, cultural and social groups. More recent neopluralism as well as neocorporatism has 
emphasized cooperation rather than conflict among diverse groups (Berry, 2010; May and Koski, 
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2007; Schuggs, 2003), as well as less participation of groups in policymaking than previously 
considered (Schumaker, 2013). The idea is that pluralist institutions are open to such a wide 
diversity of groups, the institution is less likely to be dominated by a single group (Schuggs, 
2003). Some policy domains appear to be “groupless” (Peterson, 1981, p. 116), meaning that 
organized groups are expected to influence policymaking less than other factors such as 
economic conditions or values held by politicians (Schumaker, 2013, p. 263). Grouplessness may 
be a misinterpretation of the group consensus-building process that occurs prior to proposing a 
policy recommendation to elected officials, described as “board room” politics (Gormley, 1986). 
This phenomenon has been tested on green building mandates (May and Koski, 2007) and 
bipartisan agenda-setting for renewable energy policy (Brown and Hess, 2016). These studies 
suggest that what is actually occurring is counterbalancing, a close relative to grouplessness, that 
occurs when oppositional interest groups reach consensus or their policy position is otherwise 
negotiated and shifted towards the middle. For example, Lubell, Feiock, and Handy (2009) test 
the theory that “interest groups with pro-environmental attitudes will counterbalance 
development interests.” Along this line of reasoning, the counterbalanced hypothesis is 
proposed: 
H3 (Counterbalanced): When the proportion of traditional and green construction interest 
group members per capita is roughly equal, construction industry interest groups are not 
likely to have a statistically significant effect on the adoption of energy efficient building 
mandates.  
Extent research reports mixed findings regarding the effects of interest groups on 
environmental and sustainability policy adoption. Research findings seem to depend on the 
nature of the interest groups and the type of policies being studied. In some studies, the inclusion 
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of business groups in policy deliberations had no statistically significant effect on sustainability 
policy adoption but environmental group involvement did have an effect (Berry and Portney, 
2013; Portney and Berry, 2016). Deslatte and Swann (2016) found a different breakdown of 
interest group effects, discovering that neighborhood associations and corporations were 
statistically significant in selecting a bundle of energy policy tools but many groups were not 
statistically significant, such as chambers, general public, environmental groups, developers or 
HOAs.  
Effects seem to also depend on the type of policy, which is the dependent variable in the 
statistical models in the reviewed literature. For example, when modeling green construction 
policies, land use decisions, and energy information separately, Deslatte and Swann (2016) 
found that environmental groups were significant while developers were not. Regarding the 
strength of influence, May and Koski (2007) found that homebuilder’s associations had the 
strongest opposition to building codes, with three times greater influence than advocacy groups 
including energy code associations and conservation groups (p. 57). Looking across extent 
research studies, the significance of various types of interest groups in environmental and 
sustainability policy adoptions has been inconclusive.  
In a study not in urban policy literature but rather in energy policy studies, Jenner et al. 
(2012) examined interest group influence on renewable energy policy adoption. The interest 
groups were operationalized by years of existence of state chapters of the International Solar 
Energy Association (ISEA) and National Nuclear Association (NNA). The effect sizes for the 
solar chapters range from 1.33 to 3.77 in relative odds of policy adoption and nuclear chapters 
range from -0.24 to 0.67. Overall, the effects of interest groups on urban policy adoption are 
varied across studies, from having no effect to having a strong effect. The type of sustainability 
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policy and type of interest group seems to matter to the assessment of interest group effects on 
policy adoption.    
Background on Building Energy Codes  
Building codes are an interactive set of technical policy statements that govern all aspects 
of buildings, including structural engineering, fire and life safety, electrical, mechanical, and 
fenestration. The codes include thousands of individual policy statements that correspond with or 
are conditional on other statements within the set of codes. Building energy codes are the 
policies that govern the energy efficiency component of buildings (e.g., International Code 
Council, 2012). Building codes are continually developed by a nonprofit, the International Code 
Council (ICC) over the course of three years, and elected officials at every level of government 
have the option to adopt the revised building codes in staggered three or six year cycles.  
The policies are administered by code officials who are government staff or contractors 
and implemented by construction industry professionals during the building design and 
construction process.  Across the United States, the process of building is regulated at the state 
and local levels, aside from federal buildings which are regulated at the federal level. Plans for 
new construction must go through a state or local government permit process before building 
begins and this process ensures that builders meet local codes. Throughout these steps, 
particularly during the code development and adoption processes, a network of construction 
industry professionals, environmental advocacy groups, code officials, and elected officials share 
information, develop policy proposals, and compete for policy change (Building Codes 
Assistance Project, 2017).   
The expanded scope of codes to include energy efficiency was initiated as a result of the 
1992 Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA) when commercial energy code adoption (but 
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not enforcement) became mandated for states (Lee and Yik, 2004, p. 482; Nelson, 2012, p. 183). 
However, mainly due to limited federal authority in mandating subnational codes due to the 
federalist structure in the United States that grants power to the states, fifteen years later only 70 
percent of states had some sort of energy code - mostly for commercial buildings and not 
residential buildings - and the codes have been poorly enforced (Nelson, 2012, p. 183).  State 
statutory structures largely determine code adoption at the local level. Some states require the 
local jurisdictions to meet or exceed the state code (e.g., California) while other states require 
local jurisdictions to not exceed state law (e.g., Utah). Some states have a home rule structure 
where local governments have the authority to adopt codes independent of the state code (e.g., 
Colorado, Arizona) (International Code Council, 2017).  
Nelson (2012) built a dataset of state level code adoption from 1977 to 2006. On average, 
states had adopted only two energy code versions over those 30 years (Nelson, 2012, p. 186). 
More recently, there has been a notable increase in governments’ adoption of energy codes. 
Many governments have adopted two or three new codes over the last decade. The American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 signed into law by President Obama required states 
receiving stimulus funding to meet or exceed the 2009 International Energy Conservation Code 
or its equivalent, ASHRAE Standard 90.1-2007 (U.S. DOE, 2017). Thus, the 2009 energy code 
version is considered the contemporary status quo and previously dated codes are obsolete. Some 
states accepted stimulus funding but refused to adopt the 2009 energy codes, arguing that the 
state did not have authority over codes.  
Building energy codes are particularly interesting to study because energy codes 
represent a clear divergence between the traditional building codes that regulate structures, fire 
and life safety, and the expanded scope of codes that also regulate energy efficiency, causing a 
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point of contention among industry professionals who fear that code advancement will cut into 
profits and create hardship for their companies. A 2016 blog excerpt from the environmental 
nonprofit advocacy group, National Resources Defense Council (NRDC) on the 2018 code 
development hearings captures typical controversies around energy codes:  
“Given how critical strong building energy codes are in the fight against the dangers of 
climate change, recent events in the residential energy code development process are very 
troubling. Code officials, builders, energy efficiency advocates, and others met last 
month in Louisville, KY for Technical Advisory Committee hearings for the 
development of the 2018 International Energy Conservation Code. Unfortunately for 
those of us who recognize energy efficiency as an unequivocal win for both homeowners 
and the environment, the advisory committee was beholden to the desires of the building 
industry to stick with the status quo—or worse. Advisory committee members not only 
rejected just about every proposal that would increase the energy efficiency—and 
therefore, the important climate benefits—of the energy code, they also took steps to roll 
back its efficiency.”          
(NRDC and Urbanek, 2016)  
Indeed, adding energy to the model codes has continuously caused backlash from the traditional 
construction industry, including many builders and code officials alike, who reject that 
mandatory building codes should be expanded from their central focus on structural stability, fire 
and life safety to also regulate environmental issues (Eisenberg and Yost, 2004). However, 
energy codes are arguably the most effective way to reduce energy consumption and greenhouse 
gas emissions from the buildings sector because this mandatory policy tool applies to all new 
construction and major renovation of existing buildings, prompting environmental advocates to 
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oppose conservation industry professionals and code officials (Lee and Yik, 2004, p. 479). The 
2012 energy code version was determined to achieve 30 percent more energy efficiency than 
buildings constructed to the 2006 energy code version (U.S. DOE, 2014). Given the 50 percent 
growth rate in U.S. buildings since 1980 and expected exponential growth over the next few 
decades (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2017), regulating new building construction is 
imperative to reaching governments’ climate, energy, and sustainability goals (Nelson, 2012).  
Research Design 
Case Selection and Dependent Variable 
Historical code adoption data is not readily available at the local level. Rather, only 
current code statuses are available for municipalities. The interest of this study is to examine the 
contemporary energy code policy arena rather than the historical trends when codes were 
updated far less frequently. Thus, the most recently adopted version of the energy code is used to 
construct the dependent variable.   
In home rule states, energy code adoptions are typically tracked at the city levels whereas 
in non-home rule states codes are typically tracked at the state levels due to resource constraints 
of energy code advocacy groups and government agencies that perform code tracking. Further, 
more variation of energy code versions exists across cities in home rule states compared to non-
home rule states (Cort and Butner, 2012), providing optimal case selection. It is unknown the 
extent to which the results are generalizable to the other 44 states, as state level activity may 
attract different types of policy actors and interest groups.  
The study involves statistical modeling 221 cities within seven home rule states (Arizona, 
Colorado, Kansas, Missouri, North Dakota, South Dakota, Wyoming) to understand cities’ 
actions when granted autonomy by their state legislatures. The sample size is limited to cities 
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whose energy code adoptions are tracked by national, state or local organizations, including data 
collected from the International Code Council (ICC) and Building Codes Assistance Project 
(BCAP) as well as information from city ordinances and webpages that is easily accessible using 
modern data collection tools, as explained below. The ICC randomly collects code adoption 
information by allowing jurisdictions to self-report adopted codes on the ICC website and by 
leveraging local relationships to stay up-to-date on code changes (ICC, 2017). BCAP, a program 
within the Alliance to Save Energy, has a similar process for code tracking (BCAP, 2018). In an 
attempt to collect additional data beyond what is available from ICC and BCAP, I used the 
Python package, Google to programmatically return a list of URLs from the search string, “city 
of” [state name] adopts international energy conservation code. Most web links pointed to a 
city’s building code or a city’s web page that lists the currently adopted building codes. Two of 
the weblinks pointed to databases of local code adoptions maintained by the States of Colorado 
and Kansas. Very few local code websites were found in North Dakota, South Dakota and 
Wyoming. I reviewed each landing page to add to the data set of adopted code version and year 
of last code update.  
The dependent variable contains two ordered categories: the base level represents 
municipalities with outdated energy codes, ranging from no energy codes to the 2009 
International Energy Conservation Code (IECC) version. The second category represents the 
most up-to-date energy codes, including cities that have adopted the 2012 or 2015 IECC 
versions. Table 3-2 shows the fairly balanced distribution of local policy adoptions in cities 
within home rules states. 
[Insert Table 3-2 Here]  
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Focal Independent Variables  
In this study, the interest group variable is constructed using counts of traditional 
construction industry association members and green building association members normalized 
by population, similar to the interest group variable construction in previous studies (e.g., 
Baumgartner and Leech, 1998; Gilens and Page, 2014; Jenner et al., 2012; May and Koski, 
2007). I also create a “member proportion” variable to operationalize the proportion of 
traditional to green interest group members per capita to measure effects when the presence of 
the two groups are roughly equal in a city. I select the ratio of 2 to 1 or less as a measure of 
“roughly equal” based on an analysis of the data. The member proportion variable is 
dichotomously coded as 0 or 1.  
Dues-paying trade association membership represents interest group presence in a city. 
The two most prominent trade associations that participate in local energy code policy processes 
across U.S. cities are the US Green Building Council (USGBC) with more than 12,000 members 
(US Green Building Council, 2017) and the National Association of Homebuilders (NAHB) with 
more than 140,000 members, one third of which are builders and remodelers (NAHB, 2017). 
Both groups have paid staff and local chapters that lobby locally and mobilize their members to 
support their group’s policy goals. While it is not ideal to use member counts because not all 
members participate in local policy processes, some degree of member inactivity occurs in both 
types of trade associations so the effect of member inactivity is naturally occurring across the 
two types of groups. The USGBC member list is available as an Excel download in its entirety, 
whereas the NAHB member list was created by examining member address locations from 
member directories hosted by local associations. The NAHB data was collected using the Python 
Beautiful Soup program to programmatically read data from association webpages.  
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Political and Community Characteristics (Control Variables) 
Political Institutions. The conventional viewpoint is that mayor-council forms of 
government are expected to be more open to the influences of interest groups compared to 
council-manager governments (Bae and Feiock, 2013; Hawkins, Krause, Feiock and Curley, 
2016; Sharp, Daley and Lynch, 2011). Theoretically, the council-manager governments enable 
sustainability departments to be somewhat insulated from political pressures and better able to 
respond to policy issues with a relatively unbiased long-term, technical approach that emphasizes 
operational efficiencies compared to government departments within mayoral forms of 
government (Bae and Feiock, 2013; Daley, Sharp and Bae, 2013; Krause and Douglas, 2005). 
Further, in a low salience, technical policy arena such as building energy codes, council-manager 
institutional structure is expected to be more likely to have government staff engage with 
technical experts to craft a building code policy that has better chances of being adopted than a 
code policy that does not include technical input from building professionals prior to the policy 
hearing (Brown and Hess, 2016; Gormely, 1986; May and Koski, 2007). The political 
institutions variable is dichotomously coded as mayor-council form of government (1) or other 
form of government (0). 
Climate Commitment. A measure of city support is whether they have made a public 
commitment to climate protection, as indicated by mayoral signatories to the Climate Protection 
Agreement or if the city is a member of ICLEI Local Governments for Sustainability. The choice 
to construct this variable by combining data on mayoral signatories and ICLEI members is 
intended to capture preferences and constraints by different types of local governments. ICLEI 
membership costs money and may be out of reach for some cities (Yi, Krause and Feiock, 2017). 
Additionally, ICLEI membership supports a technocratic approach to city sustainability where 
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technical resources are utilized by the local governments (Krause, Feiock and Hawkins, 2016, p. 
117). The variable construction is intended to capture the variety of approaches that cities take to 
sustainability whether the efforts are led by the mayor or city manager as directed by the city 
council. It is dichotomously coded for cities that have made a climate commitment (1) or not (0).   
Government and Industry Capacity. In most cities, the city planning and building 
department relies on general revenue and/or development permit fees to fund government staff to 
implement buildings policies. In the absence of a centralized data source for development permit 
fees, general revenue is used as a measure of government capacity for adopting new building 
policies, as cities with greater financial health are more likely to adopt sustainability policies 
(Krause, 2011; Lubell et al., 2009; Sharp et al., 2011). I use general revenue per capita as a 
measure of government and industry capacity.  
Secondly, a measure of government and industry capacity for advancing building codes is 
the number of construction industry professionals in the community, as this industry is expected 
to generate income for the government in terms of tax revenue and building permit fees and a 
larger construction industry is more likely to have technical expertise to contribute to shaping 
and implementing new building code policies. The Chief Building Official with input from staff 
is typically responsible for presenting building code proposals to the legislative branch. When 
building and development in a community is low, then the planning/building department has 
very limited capacity and is less likely to propose code advancements because code 
advancements have transaction costs including training needed for government staff and industry 
members (Nelson, 2012). Governments are less likely to impose added financial burdens on the 
construction industry when construction activity is low. Further, some cities have vastly different 
quantities of construction activity than other cities, so code advancements could be a lower 
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priority in cities with little to no new construction. Population and the number of construction 
workers in a city are correlated variables, so only population is included in the model.  
City Size and Socioeconomic Conditions: Population, Income and Education. Cities with 
large populations are likely to experience urbanization pressures, such as limited land availability 
and high building density, which in turn puts demands on energy and water resources. These 
pressures are likely to cause governments to adopt more stringent energy codes to control 
building growth and resource use (Cidell and Cope, 2014; Daley, Sharp and Bae, 2013; 
Kontokosta, 2011; Saha, 2009). However, cities also need income from tax revenue and building 
permits to afford new code adoptions and do not want to deter builders from bringing jobs and 
capital into the community. Thus, code stringency can be seen as a privilege afforded by cities 
with wealthy, educated residents where sustainability and advanced buildings policies are more 
likely to be supported (Hawkins et al., 2016; Lee and Koski, 2012; Sharp et al., 2011). May and 
Koski also found that states with a larger construction sector were more likely to adopt green 
building mandates, insinuating that energy efficiency is more prevalent in booming construction 
markets where wealth is more widespread. To operationalize education, I use the percent of the 
population over age 25 that holds a Bachelor’s degree or higher. For income, I use the median 
household income for each city. The city population is included in the models in the logged 
form. 
Problem Severity. Cities may be more likely to adopt new building codes when buildings-
related problems in their communities are heightened. Two measures of buildings-related issues 
are urbanization pressures from high levels of new construction activity and electricity costs. 
Cities vary widely in levels of construction activity. Some cities are mostly built-out with some 
infill development but little to no land for new subdivisions. Other cities have plentiful 
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opportunities for new construction, either by demolishing existing buildings or using vacant land. 
Cities with high new construction activity have more opportunity to be impacted by modern 
codes than cities with less activity. The median housing age in the community accounts for this 
variation.  
When energy is costly, communities are more likely to seek opportunities for energy 
savings, such as through energy codes. Cities with higher local energy costs have more 
opportunity to gain costs savings from building operations achieved by modern energy code 
advancements (Nelson, 2012). Where energy is costlier, the payback period on energy efficiency 
improvements is lesser compared to places where energy is cheaper. I expect that higher energy 
costs, measured by average electricity costs per county, are associated with higher likelihood to 
adopt more stringent energy codes. Where county data is not available, I take the average 
electricity cost for the state. Table 3-3 shows the descriptions and sources for all variables.  
[Insert Table 3-3 Here] 
Data Analysis and Discussion 
 Exploratory data analysis lends insights into how the data will perform in the regression 
model. As expected, far more USGBC members are present in cities with modern codes than in 
cities with outdated codes, anticipating a positive coefficient on the green interest group variable 
(Table 3-4). Further, far more cities with modern codes have commitments from political 
leadership as signatories of the Mayor’s Climate Protection Agreement or ICLEI members, so 
we can expect the climate commitment variable to have a positive effect as well. General 
revenue, population, household income and education are all higher in cities with modern codes. 
The max median age of housing is lower in cities with modern codes than outdated codes, 
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suggesting that higher levels of new construction activity relative to the total building stock in 
these cities are happening under outdated codes. This could signify the desire of cities to attract 
construction activity as a way to generate revenue and jobs by keeping old building codes that 
are more flexible and less costly for construction workers to build to. Surprisingly, the average 
and maximum unit costs of energy is lower in cities with modern codes. I would have expected 
the energy costs to be higher in these cities, and that they would use energy codes as a way to 
lower energy costs for homeowners and tenants.   
[Insert Table 3-4 Here] 
Model Selection 
The regression model includes 221 cities: 76 cities with outdated energy codes and 145 
cities with modern energy codes. The number of observations is limited to cities where code 
adoption information is readily available and control variables matched on city name and state. 
The dependent variable has two categories of building energy codes representing an increased 
level of code stringency, from outdated codes to modern codes. For this study, the outdated 
codes are grouped as the IECC 2009 and any code version published before the IECC 2009, and 
modern codes are the 2012 and 2015 IECC.  As stated in the Background section, the 2009 IECC 
is considered status quo as it was required as a condition for subnational governments receiving 
stimulus funding under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. Given the nature 
of the dependent variable, logistic regression is used to estimate the effects of trade association 
members on code stringency in local jurisdictions while controlling for social, economic, and 
political factors. The regression with logit link function estimates the log odds that the event 
occurs. The model estimates the coefficients corresponding to each focal predictor and control 
variables. Due to lack of interpretability of log odds, the logit coefficients are converted to odds 
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ratios calculating the odds that the city has adopted modern codes given the vector of X values. 
The exponent of the coefficient is the odds ratio.   
Parameter Estimates 
Traditional industry association groups are hypothesized to be less concerned about 
negative externalities associated with the environmental impacts from buildings and more 
concerned with maximizing profits, and therefore less likely to internalize incremental building 
costs. This theory is supported as traditional industry association groups are associated with 
lower levels of modern energy code adoption (Table 3-5). Holding all other independent 
variables at their means, a one standard deviation increase in traditional members per 1000 
people decreases the odds of modern energy code adoption by 16 percent.  
[Insert Table 3-5 Here] 
 
Green building interests seek to gain profits within the construction industry but may be 
willing to internalize some of the incremental costs associated with building green, which is 
supported if the green building interest group is associated with higher levels of energy code 
adoption. This hypothesis is not supported by the model as the green interest group variable is 
not statistically significant. The effect of green interest groups is generally positive but the 
standard errors are too large to get a reliable estimate of the effects. The lack of significance of 
the green interest group could be explained by these members building beyond baseline codes 
and therefore not being overly concerned with the stringency of building energy codes. They are 
building to above-code standards given their association with the green building program, 
Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED). Their building expertise is already at 
an advanced level that goes above baseline building codes.   
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The member proportion variable indicating when the balance of traditional and green 
industry association members is roughly equal – determined if the ratio of traditional to green 
interest groups is 2:1 or less - attempts to capture the stakeholder engagement process that 
commonly occurs within the energy code policy arena where interest groups negotiate a code 
change package that works for both sides described by the “counterbalanced” hypothesis4. 
Statistically speaking, this is the null hypothesis as neither membership group is expected to have 
an effect on energy code policy adoption when this scenario occurs. Again, the standard errors 
are quite large on the member proportion variable, so the model has difficultly generating a 
reliable parameter estimate.   
Regarding the control variables, the form of government does not seem to matter when it 
comes to modern energy code adoption. Energy codes have advanced nearly equally in cities 
with council-manager governments and mayor-council governments. This is surprising given the 
technical nature of building codes and the tendency for governments with city managers to be 
more likely to collaborate with community stakeholders on policy development, presumably 
finding technical specifications that work for local building practices. It could be that the mayor-
council governments are able to push building codes through the policy adoption process with 
less engagement from the building community. While the codes might get through the adoption 
process, engagement with the building community in designing the building codes could make 
policy implementation more effective. The adoption of modern building codes does not 
                                                
4 The member proportion variable is generated from two other independent variables. Testing for 
multicollinearity, the Variance Inflation Factor on the member proportion variable is 1.76, 
indicating a very moderate level of multicollinearity. Withholding the member proportion 
variable from the model does not substantially alter the coefficients or significance on any other 
variables.  
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necessarily guarantee compliance by the industry, which is expected to be improved when 
stakeholders are engaged in the policy design. A commitment by local executives to climate 
protection, indicated by signing the Mayor’s Climate Protection Agreement or becoming 
members of ICLEI, increases the odds that a city will adopt higher levels of energy codes by 
2.18, as cities commonly use building codes as a strategy to meet their local energy goals (Table 
3-6).  
[Insert Table 3-6 Here] 
Cities with greater financial resources are more likely to advance codes. Code 
advancements do have transaction costs, such as training programs and new code books for 
contractors and building department staff, that are commonly absorbed by the city.  While city 
fiscal conditions are correlated with modern code adoption, household income is not. Building 
energy code advancements have been framed as a way to protect lower income households from 
rising energy costs. This could explain why modern building codes are advanced in communities 
with diverse household incomes. Population is very significant to modern energy code adoption, 
while education is not. Urban sustainability literature commonly finds that higher income and 
education levels are correlated with more sustainability policy adoption, but building codes are a 
foundational policy option sometimes grouped with sustainability policies but sometimes not. 
The sustainability departments may be engaged in building energy code adoptions as it may be 
one strategy on their broader agenda, but the heavy lifting of building energy code adoption is 
typically executed by the building and planning departments. Thus, expectations for the income 
and education variables that come from sustainability literature might not be entirely applicable 
to the building code policy domain.  
 45 
Regarding problem severity, the cost of electricity is expected to be correlated with 
energy code adoptions as the payback period for energy efficiency improvements is shorter when 
energy costs are higher, making energy efficiency more attractive as a solution to high energy 
costs. Another interpretation is that energy costs would be lower where communities better 
handle their energy demand with energy efficiency programs. In reality, energy politics are far 
more complex than that. For example, cities in Wyoming have very inexpensive energy with an 
average cost of only $0.08 per kWh compared to Kansas where average energy costs are $0.12 
per kWh. The statistical modeling estimates that a one standard deviation increase in energy 
costs is correlated with an 18 percent decrease in the likelihood to adopt more stringent energy 
codes. This is counterintuitive and is likely picking up effects of energy conditions and energy 
mixes (i.e. mix of cheap coal compared to natural gas or renewables). Finally, the median year of 
housing age was expected to capture information about the levels of new construction activity in 
a community, but was not statistically significant.  
Given that code adoption is under jurisdiction of the local governments in home rule 
states, the sample of data collected for this study suggests that, when given local autonomy, some 
local governments adopt modern building standards while others do not. Indeed, some 
communities have no energy codes or building codes at all. One might assume that building must 
not be occurring in the places with no or outdated codes. Yet, the Census estimations for 
construction industry worker in places with outdated codes is similar to cities with modern 
codes, suggesting that construction activity is present in these communities. Given that building 
energy codes are a critical policy tool for reaching global climate and energy goals, subsequent 
work could assess strategies for encouraging these communities to adopt modern building codes.   
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A limitation of this study is that it does not include all energy code interest groups due to 
resource constraints and lack of feasibility in collecting counts on each interest group involved in 
energy code policy advocacy. The Building Codes Assistance Project has designed an “energy 
codes universe” that illustrates the multitude of interest groups, nonprofits and government 
agencies involved in the energy code policy processes involving code development, adoption, 
implementation, and enforcement (BCAP, 2017). While this study examined a few of the most 
widely-known groups, subsequent research could further examine actors in the energy code 
policy arena. An obvious case selection to study is the code development hearings where the 
various stakeholders join to testify their company’s stance on code proposals, government 
members vote on the proposals, and an elected committee mediates. Subsequent research could 
review testimony to give insights into the code debates in a formal, well-established policy 
setting.      
Conclusion 
This research adds depth to the collective understanding of the types of groups that are 
participating in urban sustainability policy processes while analyzing organized interest groups 
in a highly technical sector of urban sustainability: building energy use. To date, sustainability 
research has examined policy activity in an aggregate fashion, grouping initiatives from multiple 
sectors together to better understand why some governments pursue sustainability, and others do 
not.  While this provides valuable insight, as the field of inquiry grows, it is important to more 
deeply explore specific sectors to better understand decision-making. The actor groups that are 
responsible for many aspects of the policy processes are overlooked because they are sector-
specific (Koski, 2010). This research adds a building block to sectoral research intended to be 
nested within broader sustainability research. Building codes and green building programs in 
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particular hold considerable promise for reducing greenhouse gas emissions, and yet, the politics 
and interest group mobilization is understudied.  
This study examines the power of interest groups in shaping the energy efficiency 
building requirements that cities adopt as mechanisms to achieve their sustainability goals. It 
examines the effects of traditional and ‘green’ industry member associations on policy adoption 
for energy efficient buildings. Private interest group theory anticipates the opposition of 
environmental regulation from business interest groups in the pursuit of profit maximization 
while public interest group theory predicts that business interest groups will support 
environmental regulation motivated by the protection of common public goods while being 
reasonably profitable.  
When granted local autonomy by their state legislatures under a home rule institutional 
structure, some cities pursue energy code stringency while others do not. Modeling 221 cities 
within seven home rule states, I find that the presence of traditional building interest group 
members affiliated with the National Association of Homebuilders decreases the odds of modern 
energy code adoption by 16 percent. The presence of ‘green’ interest group members from the 
U.S. Green Building Council has a positive effect on building energy codes, but the standard 
errors are too large to generate a reliable parameter estimate. This could be explained by the 
association members already building to higher standards and unconcerned with the 
advancement of building energy codes. Having the most effect on energy code adoption, a city’s 
commitment to climate protection more than doubles the likelihood of adoption, indicating the 
strong relationship between urban sustainability, climate protection and building energy codes. 
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Tables and Figures 
Table 3-1. Expected Direction of Coefficients in the Energy Code Adoption Model 
Theory Policy Position Direction of Coefficient 
Private interest Oppositional Negative 
Public interest Supportive Positive 
Counterbalanced  Negotiated No Effect/Null Hypothesis 
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Table 3-2. Most Recently Adopted Energy Code in Cities within Home Rule States 
State No Codes ≤ 2009 IECC 2012 IECC 2015 IECC 
AZ 2 (4%) 16 (35%) 23 (50%) 5 (11%) 
CO 0 21 (39%) 10 (19%) 23 (43%) 
KS 37 (61%) 8 (13%) 14 (23%) 2 (3%) 
MO 22 (5%) 13 (32%) 9 (24%) 14 (37%) 
ND 0 2 (29%) 0 5 (71%) 
SD 5 (71%) 1 (14%) 1 (14%) 0 
WY 1 (13%) 0 2 (25%) 5 (63%) 





Table 3-3. Variables, Descriptions, and Data Sources for Energy Codes Model 
Variable Description   
Dependent Variables 
Policy adoption or 
non-adoption 
Adoption of building energy codes by version (Outdated: No codes to 
2009 IECC; Modern: 2012-2015 IECC. Source: Databases 
publically available from ICC, BCAP, DOE; city, state websites 
 
Interest Groups (Focal Predictors) 
Green business 
interest group 
Number of USBGC members in each city normalized per capita 
(1,000). Source: USGBC member list, 2018 
Traditional business 
interest group  
Number of BOMA and NAHB members in each city normalized per 
capita (1,000). Source: BOMA & NAHB member directories, 2018 
Member proportion Dichotomous variable (1) for city with roughly equal traditional and 
green industry members (ratio of 2:1 or less) 
 
Political and Community Characteristics (Control Variables) 
Political Institutions and Climate Commitment  
Form of government Dichotomous variable for city that has a mayor-council form of 
government (1) or other form of government (0). Source: ICMA 
Survey, 2011 
Climate commitment Dichotomous variable for city that is a signatory of Climate Protection 
Agreement or ICLEI member. Source: U.S. Conf. of Mayors, 2018; 
ICLEI, 2018 
California Dichotomous variable for city that is located in California.  
 
Government and Industry Capacity 
 
General revenue Per capita general revenue for each city ($1000s). Source: Census of 
Governments, 2012 
 
City Characteristics and Socioeconomic Conditions 
 
Population Logged population of each city. Source: 2016 American Community 
Survey, 5 Year Estimates 
Income Median household income ($1000s). Source: 2016 American 
Community Survey, 5 Year Estimates 
Education Percent of population over age 25 with Bachelor’s Degree or higher. 




Energy cost Average cost of electricity (kWh) in each county. Where county data 
is not available, average cost in the state. Source: Energy 
Information Administration, 2017 
Median housing age Median age of housing stock in the city. Source: 2016 American 




Table 3-4. Descriptive Statistics for Energy Codes Model 
 Outdated Codes 
n = 108 
Modern Codes 
n = 113 
Statistic Mean Min Max Mean Min Max 
Green interest group 0.13 0 2 0.31 0 3.54 
Traditional interest group 0.87 0 13.4 0.73 0 8.92 
Member proportion 0.36 0 1 0.19 0 1 
Form of city government 0.21 0 1 0.23 0 1 
Climate commitment 0.09 0 1 0.31 0 1 
General revenue 2.38 0.5 109.91 2.99 0.4 136.66 
Population 9.45 6.74 13.06 10.28 5.11 14.26 
Income 53.65 19.38 119.52 66.58 27.4 246.53 
Education 0.18 0.04 0.43 0.24 0.01 0.61 
Energy cost 10.55 1.79 14.46 9.83 6.36 13.13 
Housing age 1977 1939 2010 1981 1939 2005 
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Table 3-5. Logistic Regression Results from Modeling Energy Code Adoption 
 Dependent variable: 
 Energy Code Outdated (0) or Modern (1) 
Traditional interest group -0.18*  (0.10) 
Green interest group 0.41 (0.48) 
Member proportion 0.29 (0.47) 
Form of city government 0.57 (0.41) 
Climate commitment 0.78*  (0.45) 
General revenue 0.03**  (0.01) 
Population 0.55***  (0.16) 
Income 0.01 (0.01) 
Education 0.04 (0.03) 
Energy cost -0.19**  (0.09) 
Housing age 0.01 (0.01) 
Observations 221  
Log Likelihood -122.75  
Akaike Inf. Crit. 269.5  
R2 0.25  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Table 3-6. Odds Ratios for Energy Code Adoption 
 Dependent variable:  
 Energy Code Outdated (0) or Modern (1) 
Traditional interest group 0.84*  (0.10) 
Green interest group 1.51 (0.48) 
Member proportion 1.33 (0.47) 
Form of city government 1.77 (0.41) 
Climate commitment 2.18*  (0.45) 
General revenue 1.03**  (0.01) 
Population 1.73***  (0.16) 
Income 1.01 (0.01) 
Education 1.04 (0.03) 
Energy cost 0.82**  (0.09) 
Housing age 1.01 (0.01) 
Observations 221  
Log Likelihood -122.75  
Akaike Inf. Crit. 269.5  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01  
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Chapter 4 How Business Interest Groups Matter: Rare Events Modeling of Green 
Building Policy Adoption in Cities  
 
Abstract: This study examines a specific type of business interest group – construction industry 
associations - involved in the green building policy arena to understand their effects on policy 
adoptions. Using rare events logit modeling, I estimate the effects of ‘traditional’ and ‘green’ 
industry associations on green building policy adoption while controlling for political, socio-
economic and problem severity characteristics of cities. The results indicate that, not 
surprisingly, the presence of green industry association members increase the likelihood of local 
policy adoption. However, the traditional industry associations do not limit the probability of 
green building policy adoption as expected.   
 
Keywords: urban policy, cities, business interest groups, sustainability, green building  
Introduction 
Green building policies, such as building certifications, prescriptive checklists, permit fee 
reductions and green building codes, have been diffusing throughout the United States 
continuously since the 1990s when the U.S. Green Building Council launched the Leadership in 
Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) program. While originally intended to be a voluntary 
program, many state and local governments are now requiring LEED certification for 
government, commercial, industrial and residential buildings within their jurisdiction. The 
widespread adoption of these green building policies provides an opportunity to better 
understand 1) how business interest groups that are known to be influential in this policy arena at 
national and state levels of government effect adoption at the local levels, and 2) if there are 
 60 
differences in effects depending on the target population of the policies - i.e. if LEED 
requirements apply to private or public buildings5.  
Adoption of green building varies across real estate markets and building types. The 
National Green Building Adoption Index that is published each year by the real estate company, 
CBRE, shows that almost 40 percent of office building square footage in 30 major real estate 
markets are certified to green or energy efficiency standards, up from 5 percent in 2005 
indicating the growth in green buildings that has occurred over the past 15 years (CBRE, 2017). 
While this is impressive growth, it equates to only 4.7 percent of total physical buildings in these 
markets, suggesting that large office buildings in major real estate markets are more likely to be 
built to green standards than small buildings, industrial facilities, or buildings in small cities and 
towns with relatively non-competitive real estate markets (Gripne, Martel, and Lewandowski, 
2014).  
The cost to build green is typically offset by the market premium of the LEED 
certification. Research shows that building to green standards for office buildings costs 2-17 
percent more compared to conventional office buildings depending on the certification level, 
credit selection, product and design choices, and other factors (Ross et al., 2007; USGBC, 2015; 
Zuo and Zhao, 2014). Green buildings command rental and sales price premiums of 3-17 percent 
and 13-26 percent, respectively (Gripne, Martel, and Lewandowski, 2014). Costs and returns on 
investments vary widely across the country, and in some real estate markets returns on 
investments have not been quantifiable due to limited data availability about construction costs 
                                                
5 Public facilities in cities typically include convention centers, courthouses, fire stations, 
museums, warehouses, offices, parking garages, police stations, recreation facilities, schools, 
wastewater treatment plants (City of Kansas City, MO, 2017).   
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and real estate market prices (Gripne, Martel, and Lewandowski, 2014). Therefore, many 
construction industry professionals are hesitant to embrace green building as a construction 
practice, but early adopters may benefit from new market demand (Circo, 2008; Fuerst, 
Kontokosta, and McAllister, 2014; May and Koski, 2007).  
The rapid green building market growth for some building types (e.g., office buildings) 
and slow progress for other types (e.g., industrial) as well as variation in costs and benefits lends 
to uncertainty in the marketplace and green building policy arena. This provides an ideal case 
selection to examine the roles and motivations of business interest groups at the local level, an 
understudied segment of the population in urban environmental policy research.   
I begin this article with an exploration of theories on why various types of interest groups 
are expected to support or oppose green building policies that apply to public and private 
buildings. The theories lead into three hypotheses regarding the role of interest group association 
members on the adoption of local green building standards. Next I provide background 
information on the LEED program. I use rare events logit regression modeling to understand 
how two types of interest groups – traditional builders and green builders – correlate with policy 
adoption while controlling for political, socio-economic and problem severity factors. I find that 
the green building interest group is associated with increases in policy adoption while the 
traditional building interest group does not have an effect.  
Theory and Hypotheses 
Regulations for green buildings isolates a highly technical, low public salience policy 
option, tending to engage technical building experts with minimal news media or public attention 
to the issue (Koski, 2010). Green building policies typically specify if the policy applies to 
public buildings only, or to both public and private buildings. These policies can require building 
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certifications or prescriptive checklists that require minimum building standards; offer expedited 
permitting by the government’s building and planning departments when green building 
requirements are fulfilled by the builder; or provide financial incentives such as reduced permit 
fees. More recently, green building codes detailing prescriptive requirements for construction 
activity have been developed. Mostly these codes have been adopted in such a way that 
voluntary participation is encouraged rather than the mandatory compliance that is more 
commonly required with other building codes.   
This work examines two types of industry interest groups - traditional industry and green 
building association members – within the same industry. I define ‘green’ industry association 
members as having the desire for construction and land development that enables less negative 
externalities than conventional buildings in terms of carbon emissions, auto-dependency and 
excess water consumption, for example, and more positive externalities such as better indoor air 
quality and reduced operating costs for building owners (Schindler, 2010). The green industry 
association members are associated with contemporary perspectives on corporate responsibility 
where business may act in ecological interests motivated by stakeholder pressures, as well as 
ethical motivations and a desire for new economic opportunity (Bansal and Roth, 2000).  The 
traditional industry association members represent the classical economic view of the firm as a 
profit maximizer (March, 1962), associated with a motivation by profits for personal gains and 
less likelihood to internalize incremental costs associated with green building. Members in either 
organization include professionals such as builders, architects, designers and product suppliers. 
Drawing from literature on economics, policy studies and sustainability, assorted factors 
help explain why various types of business interest groups are expected to support green building 
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policies in some cases and oppose green building in other cases. Overall, some distinguishing 
factors include: 
• whether the policy applies to public buildings only or also includes privately-owned 
buildings; 
• if it is voluntary (e.g., permit fee reductions or other financial incentives) or mandatory 
(e.g., certification requirements or prescriptive green building codes); and 
• the extent to which the industry group is expected to gain a market advantage from the 
policy adoption.  
In extent research, empirical results on the effects of interest groups are widely varied. Some of 
the variation is explained by the aforementioned factors in addition to the level of government 
and how the interest group variable is constructed.  
The extent research that explores business interest effects on green and sustainability 
policy adoption often does not recognize the importance of the distinction in the policy’s target 
population, and how the target population is expected to mediate the effects. Research that uses 
privately-owned buildings as the case selection does not necessarily generalize to policies that 
apply to public buildings because of the differences in who pays the incremental costs to build to 
higher standards. Whether the target population of the policy is public or privately-owned 
buildings is often not overtly recognized as a critical emphasis or isolated in statistical modeling, 
even though the scope of a policy has long been acknowledged as a theoretical determinant in 
policy adoption (Schattschneider, 1975).  
The works of May and Koski (2007) and Koski and Lee (2012) are among the exceptions 
of literature that deeply considers how the target population matters in the urban sustainability 
literature. May and Koski (2007) provide the insight, “The seemingly benign politics of state 
adoption of green building requirements defies the conventional depiction of environmental 
policymaking as pitting industry against environmental interests”, explaining that “green 
building requirements are aimed at practices of public agencies whereas the environmental 
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regulatory focus is typically the behavior of firms” (p. 50). From this line of research, we can 
expect construction industry groups on the whole to support green building mandates that apply 
to public buildings.  
However, May and Koski (2007) did not find that homebuilders support environmental 
policies for public buildings at the state-level. They found that the presence of interest groups 
had significant effects on the adoption of green building mandates for public buildings, with 
three times greater negative influence by oppositional groups such as homebuilders (p. 59). 
Interest group effects are expected to be more significant at the state and national levels than 
local levels because interest groups are generally more active at higher levels of government 
particularly with paid professionals lobbying for their group’s policy position (Berry, 2010). 
Typically, urban sustainability research use proxies for interest group presence where the 
value of the manufacturing sector (e.g., Koski and Lee, 2014), counts of manufacturing 
establishments (e.g., Sharp, Daley, and Lynch, 2011), or combined measures of Chamber of 
Commerce members and developers represents industry group strength (e.g., Daley, Sharp and 
Bae, 2013; Schumaker, 2013). While this approach is appropriate when interest groups are 
control variables and not the focal predictor, it neglects the variation of interest groups that are 
active in specialized issue domains. Consequently, estimates of interest groups effects on 
sustainability policy adoption are widely varied. For example, in a study on local-level green 
building (buildings, not policies), Lee and Koski (2012) found statistically significant effects of 
manufacturing presence (as a proxy for industry interests) on counts of green buildings in cities 
(p. 616). In studies on broader sustainability policies, Berry and Portney (2013) did not find 
statistically significant effects of interest groups on local-level sustainability policies that apply 
to privately-owned buildings. Contrarily, Hawkins and Wang (2013) find that involvement of 
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businesses in policy adoption processes has a statistically significant positive effect on the 
number of sustainability policies adopted by cities. Empirical results are somewhat inconclusive 
on the effects of business interest groups on local green building policy adoption.   
Building for a New Economy (Support for Policy Adoption) 
Green building policies for public buildings have particular impacts on the construction 
industry.  In the “political market” (Feiock, Tavares, and Lubell, 2008), business interest groups 
may seek green building policy change for economic gain and support governments’ decisions to 
adopt green building policies, particularly when using governments’ own buildings (Hawkins 
and Wang, 2013, p. 65). Interest groups representing green construction may view governments’ 
willingness to construct buildings to green standards as an opportunity to shift the market and 
increase demand for green construction in the private sector (Berry and Wilcox, 2009, p. 28-31; 
Volokh, 2003).  
Green builders can gain market advantages by participating in energy efficient and green 
building policy processes. Industry actors can participate in a voluntary way, offering to help 
shape the guidelines (May and Koski, 2007) and bidding for contracts with the government as a 
way to learn new green building practices before the demand for green building increases. Firms 
experience the benefits of participating in advancing energy and green building policies as a way 
to differentiate themselves in the marketplace as the policies evolve to start regulating privately-
owned buildings (Cotton, 2012) or strive to marry economic development and environmental 
protection such as in Smart Growth policies (Portney, 2013). Moreover, firms generally want 
their stakeholders (clients and investors) to view their business as supportive of the environment 
and public interests (Bansal and Roth, 2000; Darnall, Potoski, and Prakash, 2010).  
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H1 (Supportive): Higher numbers of green construction interest group members per 
capita are likely to increase the probability of the adoption of green building mandates. 
Building as Usual (Opposition to Policy Adoption) 
Drawing from the economic and political theory of the firm (March, 1962), business 
interest groups seek to maximize their profits in the short and long runs and therefore oppose 
public policies that impose higher cost burdens (Coase, 1936; March, 1962; Spulber, 2007). In 
classical economics, profit maximization is determined by the production function, cost function 
and price (March, 1962, p. 668.) New green building regulations increase costs while price 
movement remains uncertain. It is unknown to builders whether the customer will pay a higher 
price for the building. Following March’s (1962) perception of business as a political coalition, 
firms are expected to form interest groups towards the goal of conflict resolution, and their 
conflict resolution strategy is expected to be stable and meaningful. The stable and meaningful 
approach to conflict resolution for traditional construction associations when it comes to 
regulations on buildings has historically been a long-standing policy position of anti-regulation, 
tolerating voluntary involvement in green building but not mandatory prescriptive requirements. 
The business sector generally prefers less government regulation and more voluntary programs, 
such as financial incentives (Kamieniecki, 2006). 
 Business interest groups may oppose green building policies, even those that apply only 
to government buildings, for at least two reasons. First, the policy signals a market shift opening 
doors to subsequent regulation requiring construction practices that can be costly and therefore 
disadvantageous to maximizing profits. Many industry actors view regulations on public 
facilities as a slippery slope for mandates on private buildings (Bae, 2014; Levmore, 2010; May 
and Koski, 2007, p. 53). Any adoption of green building policies and programs may be viewed as 
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an endorsement of green building ideals, paving the way for subsequent mandatory regulation 
that the traditional construction industry would ultimately oppose (Levmore, 2010). Further, 
market actors may negotiate with policymakers taking the stance that additional regulations are 
unwarranted because the industry professionals have already integrated green building and 
energy efficient construction practices into their businesses under a voluntary program 
(Kamieniecki, 2006). Second, the policy change may grow the market for their competitors who 
specialize in green construction (Levmore, 2010). In a finite construction industry, the total 
capital available for construction is limited. Construction industry professionals who do not 
expand into green building markets could be crowded out by professionals with modernized, 
green building skill sets (Levmore, 2010).  
H2 (Oppositional): Higher numbers of traditional construction interest group members 
per capita are likely to limit the probability of the adoption of green building mandates. 
Background on the LEED Program 
 The LEED green building program was developed in 2000 by the U.S. Green Building 
Council (USGBC), a 501(c)(3) non-profit organization founded in 1993. Continually developed 
through a consensus-based decision-making process (USGBC, 2017c), the program details 
prescriptive requirements and environmental performance standards for the design and 
construction of buildings and development projects, and more recently expanded to provide 
standards for neighborhoods and cities.  Initiated in the United States, LEED is used in over 160 
countries with over 30,000 certified projects worldwide (Shutters and Tufts, 2016). While the 
program was originally used voluntarily by construction industry professionals, it has 
increasingly been adopted by governments as a mandatory policy (Schindler, 2010).  
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 The LEED program has four levels of certification: Certified, Silver, Gold and Platinum 
(USGBC, 2017c). Building professionals can apply for certification based on the total number of 
points that the project attains, in addition to meeting minimum program requirements such as 
project size requirements. Points can be achieved in the areas of energy or water efficiency; site 
and land use development; location and transportation; indoor air quality; and sustainable 
materials and resources. To receive project certification, the project team must apply to the 
USGBC with the appropriate project documentation and registration and certification fees. Fees 
associated with the program vary by LEED program type and project size with registration fees 
starting at $1,200 and minimum fees for building design and construction certification between 
$2,850 and $27,500 depending on project size (USGBC, 2019). The USGBC Trademark Policy 
allows project owners to market their buildings as “LEED registered” or “LEED certified” based 
on if the building has only been registered or actually completed the certification process 
(USGBC, 2018c).    
Research Design 
Case Selection and Dependent Variable 
This study focuses on policies that require LEED certifications for city-level public and 
privately-owned commercial buildings, not market incentives such as expedited permitting or fee 
reductions. Only LEED certification policies are examined because industry groups are not 
expected to oppose policies for financial incentives or goal-setting, as those types of policies do 
not impose cost burdens to industry. The dependent variable is dichotomously coded for whether 
or not a city has adopted a certification policy. The source of this data comes from the Public 
Policy Library of green building requirements for cities, counties, states and federal government 
buildings maintained by the USGBC beginning in 2017 (USGBC, 2017b, 2018b). Two hundred 
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and seventy-nine cities have a LEED certification policy for public and/or privately-owned 
commercial buildings, including schools (USGBC, 2018b; Figure 4-1). California has the most 
local level green building policies, many of which are local adoptions of the state-level 
California Green Building Code to replace existing municipal requirements or amend the state 
code with local requirements.  
[Insert Figure 4-1 Here] 
Focal Independent Variables  
The focal independent variables are counts of ‘traditional’ and ‘green’ construction 
industry interest group members normalized by the total number of construction workers in the 
city. The ‘traditional’ interest group variable is comprised of members of the Building Owners 
and Managers Association (BOMA). The ‘green’ interest group variable is constructed from the 
publicly-available USGBC member list (USGBC, 2018a). There are 5,648 BOMA members in 
1,480 communities and 50,336 USGBC members in 6,301 communities. To give a sense of how 
construction professionals in a community relate to the total population, in New York City and 
Kansas City, approximately 2 percent of the total population, or 196,634 and 11,473 people, 
respectively, works in the construction industry using American Community Survey estimations. 
Nationwide, BOMA and USGBC members represent a mean of 0.2 and 0.5 percent of the 
construction industry, respectively. New York City has 570 BOMA members and 2,098 USGBC 
members. Kansas City, MO has 98 BOMA members and 285 USGBC members.   
The Washington, D.C.-based USGBC has a decentralized advocacy model where 
regional and local chapters have members, as well as paid staff, who provide local technical 
support and professional green building services and advocate for green building, which are core 
benefits of member association (Koski, 2010, p. 102; USGBC, 2019). USGBC members 
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represent a variety of professions and sectors, including product manufacturers; contractors and 
builders; corporate and retail; education and research institutions; environmental and other 
501(c)(3) nonprofit organizations; governments; finance and insurance; professional firms; trade 
associations; real estate professionals; and energy service providers (USGBC, 2017a). Members 
are granted access to an extensive library of resources, educational courses, and can market 
themselves in the membership directory (USGBC, 2019).  
BOMA is also an organization with local chapters. Clearly stated in BOMA’s policy 
positions statements,  
“BOMA International does not support the adoption and implementation of 
green/sustainable building codes intended to apply to all newly constructed buildings, or 
to all tenant finish-out, additions and major renovations to existing buildings…” (BOMA, 
2018).  
Based on their explicit policy position, it is expected that BOMA’s presence in a community will 
limit the likelihood of pushing a green building policy agenda forward. To gather counts of 
BOMA members per city, I used the Python programming language and the PDFMiner library to 
convert the 2018 BOMA Member Directory PDF to plain text. Then I found all city and state 
combinations in the text, and aggregated the counts of members in each community (BOMA, 
2018; Shinyama, 2016). 
Ideally it would be possible to construct a pooled cross sectional dataset with counts of 
all construction sector interest group members for each city in each year, but I was limited by 
time and resource constraints for data collection. Consequently, only the most dominant interest 
groups in commercial building policy processes – BOMA and USGBC - are represented in this 
research.  
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Political and Community Characteristics (Control Variables) 
Political Institutions. Various forms of government, such as mayor-council or council-
manager structures, are expected to influence several aspects of policy processes such as interest 
group engagement during agenda-setting and policy adoption (e.g., Bae and Feiock, 2013; 
Hawkins, Krause, Feiock and Curley, 2016; Sharp, Daley and Lynch, 2011). Mayor-council 
forms of government are expected to be susceptible to the influences of dominant interest 
groups. These executive arrangements are associated with an emphasis on short-term political 
gains and political alignment with powerful groups. In contrast, council-manager forms of 
government tend to be more responsive to technical experts. These government types are thought 
to have a longer-term outlook with the primary interest of maximizing operational efficiency and 
ease of policy implementation. These government types are more likely to host stakeholder 
engagement activities so that a diverse interest groups can help to shape public policies (Bae and 
Feiock, 2013; Daley, Sharp and Bae, 2013; Krause and Douglas, 2005). The political institutions 
variable is dichotomously coded for mayor-council (1) or other form of government such as 
council-manager (0) using data from the International City Management Association (ICMA) 
Municipal Yearbook and collected directly from city websites where data is not found in the 
yearbook.  
Climate Commitment. In addition to the institutional structure, the city’s commitment to 
climate protection is likely to influence the adoption of green building policies. As it relates 
specifically to climate protection, a combined measure of two indicators are used to construct the 
climate commitment variable: a dummy code if the city’s mayor is a signatory of the Mayor’s 
Climate Protection Agreement or if the city is a member of ICLEI Local Governments for 
Sustainability (1), otherwise 0. Additionally, California is included as a dummy variable in these 
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models because it has been a leader in green building policy advancement with a statewide green 
building code that cities adopt locally. Almost 30 percent of localities with LEED certification 
policies in this study are in California.  
Government and Industry Capacity. In most cities, the city planning and building 
department relies on general revenue and/or development permit fees to fund government staff to 
implement buildings policies. Thus, general revenue per capita for each city is used as a measure 
of government capacity for adopting new building policies, as building permit fee data is not 
available. Overall, cities with struggling economies may have less demand for mandatory green 
building requirements than a thriving city that is working to manage excessive growth. Further, 
cities need funding from general revenue or permit fees to manage the transaction costs, such as 
training industry members on new building practices, associated with new green building 
regulations (Nelson, 2012).  
City Characteristics and Socioeconomic Conditions: Population, Income and Education. 
Cities with larger populations have been found to be more likely to adopt LEED policies due to 
having more resources, such as government staff to implement the policy (Cidell and Cope, 
2014, p. 1774; Kontokosta, 2011, p. 75). The size of the construction industry highly correlates 
with population (0.95), so population logged is included in the models to retain consistency with 
many other policy adoption studies. Further, counts of housing units highly correlates with 
population (0.99) and was explored but is not used in these models. People with higher education 
tend to have higher incomes, which in turn typically results in a higher tax base to support 
government initiatives. The percentage of the population with a Bachelor’s degree or higher as 
well as median household income for each city are included in the model.  
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Problem Severity. Cities with very little building activity may be less likely to adopt 
modern building policies than cities with more construction activity. The median age of housing 
in a city is used as a proxy to represent the building stock in the models. Older median housing 
age is associated with less current building activity and a newer median housing age correlates 
with higher levels of recent construction activity. Further, the average electricity cost in the 
county is also used as a proxy for problem severity, as places with more expensive energy are 
likely to seek buildings policies that reduce energy usage to lessen the economic burden of 
building operations. Where county-level electricity costs is not available, I use the average 
electricity cost for the state. 
All Census variables were collected using the Python program, CenPy, which enables the 
retrieval of Census data tables into Python for data processing (e.g., formatting, joining tables) 
(Wolf, 2018). Table 4-1 shows the descriptions and variables for all data sources. 
[Insert Table 4-1 Here]  
Rare Events Logit Model and Discussion on Modeling Results 
I use rare events logit modeling to estimate the probability of LEED certification policy 
adoption given differences in the presence of trade association members across cities (King and 
Zeng, 2001). This modeling technique resamples the data to run regression simulations with all 
values of policy adopters in each simulation. I selected this method because of the sparse number 
of cities that have adopted LEED certification policies (277 cities, or 1.4 percent of cities in the 
sample). In order to understand patterns in adoption, I use a dataset of permit issuing places for 
information on non-adopters. Of the 20,100 permit issuing places in the U.S., 19,579 places have 
sufficient data to be included in the statistical models. I use the Zelig library ReLogit class in the 
R statistical computing program for modeling (Choirat et al., 2018).  
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For greatest explanatory power, I developed a full model that includes cities with LEED 
certification requirements for privately and publicly owned buildings. Next, I explore how the 
effects shift depending on whether the policy applies to privately owned buildings or publically 
owned buildings by modeling these two population subsets separately. Each model has 19,579 
cities that are bootstrapped, or resampled using the rare events logit method. The first model has 
277 cities that mandated LEED certification for any building type. The second model has 104 
cities that adopted LEED certification mandates for public buildings. The third model has 125 
adopting cities with mandates for privately owned commercial buildings (Table 4-3). The full 
model has the most explanatory power with an 𝑅" of 0.13. The public and commercial models 
have an 𝑅" of 0.07 and 0.06, respectively. 
[Insert Table 4-3 Here]  
Across all models, green interest group presence matters for LEED policy adoption. It is 
not surprising that green interest groups – operationalized by counts of USGBC members per 
1000 people – is important since the USGBC is the creator of the LEED program and has local 
association members advocating for policy adoption. This reflects the openness of local political 
systems where local business interest groups can effectively influence government policy. It also 
shows how powerful an industry association can be when they develop a voluntary program that 
gains such widespread attention and legitimacy that governments begin to adopt it as a 
mandatory requirement.  Holding all other independent variables at their means, a one standard 
deviation increase in green interest group presence increases the city’s odds of LEED 
certification policy adoption by 14 percent in the full model and 4 to 6 percent in the public and 
commercial models (Table 4-4).  
[Insert Table 4-4] 
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Figure 4-2 shows a less linear relationship between green building policy adoption and 
the traditional construction industry compared to the green construction industry. The traditional 
interest group is not significant and the effects are very small (-0.001 or less). This could be 
explained as traditional builders not viewing green building construction as their target market, 
and LEED policies being more heavily targeted at public buildings. The commercial building 
model attempts to isolate policies that regulate privately-owned commercial buildings, but these 
policies could be relatively weak and builders may be able to easily meet the LEED-certified 
requirements in some markets depending on state and local building code stringencies, rebate 
programs for energy and water efficiency, and urban design of the cities could make LEED 
credits such as proximity to public transit more easily attainable.  
[Insert Figure 4-2 Here] 
As expected, the political institutional structure and climate commitment are consistent 
with urban policy theory. Cities with mayor-council forms of governments are more likely to 
adopt green building policies.  Not surprisingly, the most impactful indicator is whether the city 
has made a commitment to climate protection as a signatory of the Mayor’s Climate Protection 
Agreement or member of ICLEI. Cities are 13 percent more likely to adopt LEED certification 
requirements when they have committed to climate protection. Similarly, given the strong state 
commitment to green building, cities within California are more likely to adopt LEED 
certification requirements.  
While population is significant across the models, the odds ratio of 1 signifies that there 
is not a substantive difference between cities that adopted or did not adopt LEED certification 
policies on this characteristic. The varied population sizes of cities adopting LEED requirements 
could be explained by the outsourced nature of LEED where a third party – the USGBC – and 
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their members are doing most of the program management and document preparation for the 
program, alleviating the administrative burden to the government. This could also be why 
general revenue is not a significant indicator of policy adoption. 
I had expected that communities with higher educational attainment and income would be 
more likely to have LEED certification policies. This expectation is met for education but not 
income. A one standard deviation increase in education increases the city’s odds of policy 
adoption by 7 percent. Income is not significant, which is not surprising since it is a measure of 
household income whereas LEED building policies typically effect commercial real estate and 
not residential. I had also expected that higher energy costs and newer building stocks to be 
likely to increase the odds of policy adoption. While energy cost and housing age have negative 
coefficients, the odds ratios are 1 indicating that there is no significant difference between 
adopting and non-adopting cities.   
As illustrated by the statistical modeling in this study, the ability to identify distinctive 
motivations within a type of interest group can help explain how distinctive segments within a 
business interest effect urban policymaking differently rather than treating business interests as 
the same across the sector. The traditional industry association had a negative effect on LEED 
policy adoption while the green industry group had a positive effect, similar to findings in May 
and Koski (2007). These groups both represent the construction industry, yet have very different 
effects on LEED certification policy adoption.  
In line with the microeconomic theory that firms are profit maximizers and will seek 
market differentiation to secure profits, the green industry association members are well-
positioned to absorb the new market for green building that is grown by city policy adoption 
compared to their traditional peers who have not distinguished themselves as having green 
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building expertise. The green industry association members may be ideologically motivated, 
realizing that firms can obtain substantial profits while also supporting environmental protection, 
or they may just be strategic profit maximizers motivated to get a share of a new untapped 
market. Either way, this study shows that their presence increases the likelihood of green 
building policy adoption unlike their traditional peers.  
Regarding effects of the control variables, many were statistically significant but had 
odds ratios of 1, indicating no apparent difference between cities with or without LEED 
certification policies. LEED certifications are most common for commercial buildings, 
particularly office buildings, so demographic variables might be representing latent concepts 
such as urban development patterns involving concentrations of office parks and surrounding 
residential developments, or diverse urban core development patterns in these cities and towns. 
Controlling for city characteristics that characterize local commercial real estate markets, such as 
number of office buildings in the city or the competitiveness of the local office rental market, 
might provide a better fit for modeling LEED policies, but this data is not readily available 
unless purchased from CBRE, a company that sells commercial real estate data for local markets.  
 A limitation to this study is that it explores only two industry associations of many 
groups that are involved in influencing building-related policy adoption. I attempted to select the 
most distinctive and influential groups, but without surveying government staff and political 
leaders or counting testimonies from public hearings it is difficult to validate the selection of the 
two groups. The USGBC is an obvious choice as it is the organization that developed LEED. 
BOMA is known to be highly influential and oppositional in building-related policy adoption 
processes, according to expert knowledge and their explicit oppositional policy statement cited 
earlier in this paper. Other groups are also influential, though. An article on why some industry 
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groups are trying to ban green building standards (Badger, 2013) points to the American High-
Performance Buildings Coalition (AHPBC) as an industry-led coalition opposing LEED 
(AHPBC, 2018a, 2018b). The 42 coalition members listed on the AHPBC website are product-
oriented councils and associations, each with their own membership populations. The Coalition 
supports “reasonable performance based policies” and “voluntary adoption” similar to BOMA’s 
policy position statement. A subsequent study could model the sums of members in the 42 
industry groups for an estimation of their effects on mandatory green building policy adoption at 
the local level.  
Conclusion  
The green building policy arena allows for a careful examination of the role that business 
interests play in the adoption and diffusion of sustainability policies at the local level. This 
research segments interest groups that represent a major industry (construction) by isolating 
traditional and green building interests in order to examine interest group behavior in 
sustainability policy adoption in more detail. Contributing to sustainability research, isolating 
business interest groups into distinct segments is conducive to explaining effects on urban 
policymaking with greater nuance than the more commonly taken empirical approach that treats 
business interest groups as one unit.  
In this study, the presence of green building interest group members matter to LEED 
policy adoption, increasing the odds of LEED policy adoption by up to 14 percent, while the 
traditional building interest group had very little influence. It is not surprising that the USGBC 
industry group supports LEED policy adoption as the group is expected to gain a market 
advantage from the policy change. It is, however, surprising that the presence of traditional 
construction industry group members does not have a significant negative effect on LEED 
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certification policy adoption as private industry is expected to reject mandatory regulations due 
to potential effects of the new construction practices cutting into profits and the policy change 
growing the market for their competitors.  
 The policy’s target population – public or commercial buildings – was not a 
distinguishing factor in this study, but theoretically the policy scope is expected to be an 
important consideration as construction industry groups are expected to be more likely to support 
policies that regulate public buildings than private buildings due to who pays the incremental 
cost for green construction. More research is needed that isolates policies that apply to public and 
commercial buildings to determine the conditions under which the policy scope matters.  
A city’s commitment to climate protection increases the odds of LEED policy adoption 
by 13 percent, indicating the strong relationship between urban sustainability goals and green 
building policy strategies. This study deviates from broad sustainability research by examining 
the types of interest groups that are active in the green building sector of sustainability. This is an 
important approach because each aspect of sustainability has distinctive interest groups that 
participate, and so treating sustainability as a broad concept misses the nuances of each policy 
domain within it. As the urban sustainability field grows, more acutely examining specific 
sectors will facilitate a better understanding of the actor groups that are influential urban 
sustainability policy processes.      
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Tables and Figures 




Table 4-1. Variables, Descriptions, and Data Sources for Green Building Models 
Variable Description   
Dependent Variables 
Policy adoption or 
non-adoption 
Adoption of LEED certification requirements for any buildings; 
commercial buildings only; public buildings only; or non-adoption. 
Source: USGBC database, 2018; U.S. Census, 2017 
 
Interest Groups (Focal Predictors) 
Green business 
interest group 
Number of USBGC members in each city normalized by the total 
number of construction workers in the city. Source: USGBC 
member list, 2018 
Traditional business 
interest group  
Number of BOMA members in each city normalized by the total 
number of construction workers in the city. Source: BOMA 
directory, 2018 
 
Political and Community Characteristics (Control Variables) 
Political: Institutions and Ideology  
Form of government Dichotomous variable for city that has a mayor-council form of 
government (1) or other form of government (0). Source: ICMA 
Survey, 2011 
Climate commitment Dichotomous variable for city that is a signatory of Climate 
Protection. Source: U.S. Conf. of Mayors, 2018; ICLEI, 
2018Agreement or ICLEI member 
California Dichotomous variable for city that is located in California 
 
Government and Industry Capacity 
 
General revenue Per capita general revenue for each city ($1000s). Source: Census of 
Governments, 2012 
 
City Characteristics and Socioeconomic Conditions 
 
Population Logged population of each city. Source: 2016 American Community 
Survey, 5 Year Estimates 
Income Median household income ($1000s). Source: 2016 American 
Community Survey, 5 Year Estimates 
Education Percent of population over age 25 with Bachelor’s Degree or higher. 




Energy cost Average cost of electricity (kWh) in each county. Where county data 
is not available, average cost in the state. Source: Energy 
Information Administration, 2017 
Median housing age Median age of housing stock in the city. Source: 2016 American 




Table 4-2. Descriptive Statistics for Green Building Policy Adoption Models 
 No Policy 
n = 19,302 
Adopted Policy 
n = 277 
Statistic Mean Min Max Mean Min Max 
Green interest group 0.004 0 2 0.03 0.00 0.53 
Traditional interest group 0.002 0 19 0.01 0.00 0.29 
Form of city government 0.14 0 1 0.25 0 1 
Climate commitment 0.04 0 1 0.60 0 1 
California 0.02 0 1 0.30 0 1 
General revenue 1.61 0.00 953.24 2.43 0.37 80.17 
Population 7.19 0.00 14.26 10.91 6.91 15.95 
Income 48.56 0.00 250.00 72.46 19.52 243.70 
Education 0.13 0.00 1.00 0.25 0.07 0.49 
Energy cost 10.97 1.79 39.36 12.59 2.18 27.55 






Table 4-3. Rare Events Logit Results from Modeling Green Building Policy Adoption 
Dependent variable: LEED Certification Policy Adoption 
 Full Model Public Model Commercial Model 
Green interest group 0.13*** 0.04*** 0.06*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Traditional interest group -0.0004 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.01) (0.004) (0.004) 
Form of city government -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Climate commitment 0.12*** 0.06*** 0.05*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
California 0.10*** 0.03*** 0.04*** 
 (0.01) (0.003) (0.004) 
General revenue 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 (0.0001) (0.00) (0.00) 
Population 0.01*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.0003) (0.0004) 
Income 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Education 0.06*** 0.02*** 0.03*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Energy cost -0.0002 -0.0003* 0.0001 
 (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Housing age -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001** 
 (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Constant 0.21** 1.20*** 1.14*** 
 (0.10) (0.06) (0.07) 
 
Observations 19,579 19,579 19,579 
R2 0.13 0.07 0.06 
Adjusted R2 0.13 0.06 0.06 
Residual Std. Error (df = 19567) 0.11 0.07 0.08 
F Statistic (df = 11; 19567) 269.09*** 123.74*** 111.96*** 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Table 4-4. Odds Ratios for Green Building Policy Adoption Models 
Dependent variable: LEED Certification Policy Adoption 
 Full Model Public Model Commercial Model 
Green interest group 1.14*** 1.04*** 1.06*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Traditional interest group 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 (0.01) (0.004) (0.004) 
Form of city government 0.99*** 0.99*** 0.99*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Climate commitment 1.13*** 1.06*** 1.06*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
California 1.10*** 1.03*** 1.04*** 
 (0.01) (0.003) (0.004) 
General revenue 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Population 1.01*** 1.00*** 1.00*** 
 (0.001) (0.0003) (0.0004) 
Income 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Education 1.07*** 1.02*** 1.03*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Energy cost 1.00 1.00* 1.00 
 (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Housing age 1.00*** 1.00*** 1.00** 
 (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Constant 1.23** 3.32*** 3.13*** 
 (0.10) (0.06) (0.07) 
 
Observations 19,579 19,579 19,579 
R2 0.13 0.07 0.06 
Adjusted R2 0.13 0.06 0.06 
Residual Std. Error (df = 19567) 0.11 0.07 0.08 
F Statistic (df = 11; 19567) 269.09*** 123.74*** 111.96*** 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Chapter 5 Interest Groups, Policy Impacts, and Advocacy Biases 
Abstract: This study explores the nature of information that is shared by various organizations 
in the context of the green building program, Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design 
(LEED). It tests two competing hypotheses – advocacy bias and interest group professionalism – 
to identify if there is systematic variation across published studies on energy savings from 
LEED-certified buildings. Using a meta-regression methodology, I find that studies that have an 
environmental organization as the primary author are likely to report higher levels of energy 
savings from LEED buildings when compared to studies that have government agencies or 
universities as the primary author. Based on results of a paired t-test, LEED buildings use an 
average of 14 percent less site energy use intensity than non-LEED buildings.  
 
Keywords: interest group, information sharing, advocacy bias, green building, LEED 
Introduction 
The amount of energy that buildings consume is a critical aspect of urban sustainability 
and an important part of the solution for climate change mitigation. The buildings sector 
accounts for 32 percent of the world’s energy use and 19 percent of global energy-related 
greenhouse gas emissions (Lucon et al., 2014). There are many opportunities to reduce energy 
consumption in buildings, including increasing insulation, reducing air infiltration, and installing 
energy efficient lighting and climate control systems. The term ‘green’ building has been coined 
to exemplify these types of opportunities, in addition to reducing water use, improving land use, 
accessing alternative transportation, and building with sustainable materials. Environmental 
activists and policymakers have been optimistic of the potential effects of building ‘green’ under 
 91 
the worldwide green building program, Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design 
(LEED). While many studies on LEED-certified buildings have found that green buildings use 
less energy than conventional buildings (e.g., Newsham, Mancini, and Birt, 2009), other studies 
have found that LEED does not always achieve reductions in energy use (e.g., Scofield, 2009, 
2013b). In some cases, LEED buildings use more energy than comparable conventional 
buildings (e.g., Scofield and Doane, 2018). As an example, a study on three LEED certified 
schools found that the LEED schools used 17 percent more source energy than other schools 
(Scofield and Doane, 2018). The major issue has been that LEED is designed for flexibility: 
building professionals can choose to earn points across multiple categories, and until recently the 
buildings did not have to meet minimum energy requirements aside from compliance with local 
building codes. The resulting uncertainty about LEED’s impacts have been widely expressed 
across many mediums, including news media (Navarro, 2009), blogs (Lstiburek, n.d; Stephens, 
2013), technical studies (New Buildings Institute, 2008), magazines (Swearingen, 2014) and 
peer-reviewed articles (Kern et al., 2016; Scofield, 2009, 2013; van der Heijden, 2015). Given 
that cities adopting LEED standards are relying on lower environmental impacts from green 
buildings to meet their climate change mitigation goals, it is important to understand why 
evaluations of energy consumption are so drastically varied across studies.  
A range of factors could explain the discrepant results across LEED evaluations. This 
paper is particularly interested in the identity and impact of authors’ affiliations as it relates to 
interest group advocacy. Authors’ affiliations represent interest group dynamics of information 
sharing with policymakers. The authors’ affiliation in an interest group is expected to influence 
important features of the study design, including case selection and framing of the story. Indeed, 
some authors are affiliated with advocacy organizations whose mission is to promote green 
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building. Of the published studies that estimate the change in energy use from LEED certified 
buildings, are some organizations who have analyzed LEEDs’ effectiveness presenting higher or 
lower energy savings than other types of organizations? More directly, do environmental groups 
report higher energy savings from the program compared to authors who are affiliated with 
academic institutions? In other words, is there an advocacy bias in green building energy 
consumption analysis? I also explore other important factors that could explain variation in 
energy outcomes, including if the evaluations were conducted using field testing or modelling 
simulations, use site or source energy as the energy unit analyzed, and the building types 
included in the analysis.  
Regarding author affiliation and informational lobbying, this research tests two 
competing theories on interest groups and the information that they release: advocacy bias and 
interest group professionalism. Advocacy bias refers to written communication that is 
intentionally constructed by interest groups to align with particular policy preferences 
(Ainsworth, 2010; Barnes and Bero, 1990; Fischer, 1990, 2003; Fischer and Forester, 1993; 
Fischer and Gottweis, 2012; Lopipero et al., 2007; Potters and van Winden, 1992; Shanahan, 
Jones and McBeth, 2011; Weible and Sabatier, 2007; Weible, 2008). In contrast, interest group 
professionalism posits that interest groups strive to create accurate and honest written material so 
as to maintain trust, credibility, and reputability with policymakers (Ainsworth, 2010; Berry and 
Wilcox, 2009; Koski and May, 2006; Lopipero et al., 2007). The duality of interest group 
pressures in terms of advocacy bias and reputational interests are explored throughout this study.  
The paper proceeds as follows. First, I discuss advocacy bias and interest group 
professionalism in more detail, leading to hypotheses about the relationships between author 
affiliation and reported energy consumption of LEED buildings. Next, I provide background 
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information on the LEED program. Then I present the research design, which centers around the 
meta-regression method, a generalized linear regression model on study characteristics obtained 
through the meta-analytic process of extracting data from documents. I describe the variables 
used in the models and explain the meta-regression method in detail. Next, I discuss results of 
the model suggesting that environmental interest groups report higher energy savings than 
studies with government or university-affiliated primary authors. Finally, I conclude with 
connecting the research findings to broader literature and policy implications. 
Theory and Hypotheses 
The game theoretic foundation for this study postulates the occurrence of information 
asymmetry between policymakers and interest groups as policymakers need expert information 
from interest groups, but do not know the extent to which the information provided is biased 
towards the interest groups’ ideological preferences (Koski and May, 2006; Martimort and 
Sememov, 2007; Potters and Winden, 1992). Information sharing is one of the core functions of 
interest groups in policy settings (Lopipero et al., 2007). Interest groups tend to advocate for 
their beliefs to policymakers who hold similar beliefs, which keeps transaction costs lower than 
if they were to advocate to policymakers with incongruent beliefs (Potters and Winden, 1992). 
Interest group activity commonly occurs within a “village” type of environment where 
policymakers and advocates are well-known to each other (Berry and Wilcox, 2009, p. 103). 
While the policymakers’ ideological biases are partially known to the interest group since the 
interest group knows how the policymaker has voted in the past, the interest group does not how 
the policymakers’ stance might shift over time or where they stand on a particular policy issue, 
creating a game setting (Martimort and Sememov, 2007). The interaction between interest 
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groups and policymakers occurs in a “repeated games” context, so while the interest group may 
want to only present information that is advantageous to their policy position, they also have 
long-term reputational interests to consider (Berry and Wilcox, 2009; Potters and Winden, 1992). 
Credibility is one of the most important characteristics of interest groups in their ability to gain 
trust from a policymaker (Berry and Wilcox, 2009, p. 103). Even still, information provided to 
policymakers can help shape policy decisions, raising the possibility of temptation for interest 
groups to provide information that only supports their policy preferences (Lopipero et al., 2007). 
These contrasting theoretical angles are broadly labeled “advocacy bias” and “interest group 
professionalism” (Table 5-1).  
[Insert Table 5-1 Here] 
Advocacy Bias 
Organized interest groups have strategic incentives to disseminate information that is 
favorable to their policy position and to conceal information that is not favorable (Barnes and 
Bero, 1990; Lopipero et al., 2007; Potters and van Winden, 1992). An overarching concept is 
informational lobbying, defined by Potters and van Winden (1992) as “the use by interest groups 
of their (alleged) expertise or private information on matters of importance for policymakers in 
an attempt to persuade them to implement particular policies” (p. 269). Some of these 
informational dynamics are motivated by strategy, but much are explained by characteristics of 
organized groups where group members tend to interpret information that resonates with their 
beliefs and values, and to form organizations with other people with similar beliefs (Sabatier and 
Weible, 2007), as well as advocate to policymakers with similar beliefs (Potters and Winden, 
1992). In political processes, people with similar beliefs form advocacy coalitions – a form of 
interest group – to act strategically to gain support for their policy beliefs (Shanahan, Jones and 
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McBeth, 2011; Weible and Sabatier, 2007; Weible, 2008). Organizations – like individuals – are 
likely to discount information that does not align with organizational values and goals. 
Consequently, “it is often thought that information from interest groups is hopelessly biased” 
(Ainsworth, 2010, p. 92).  
Various strains of research provide theory and evidence of biases in information 
published by organized interest groups. While much of this literature takes a game theory 
approach due to the difficulties associated with this type of data collection, some of the research 
provides empirical evidence derived from qualitative analysis of written material (e.g., Lopipero 
et al., 2007; Olofsson, Weible, Heikkila, and Martel, 2017). Perhaps most extreme, well-known 
cases are tobacco companies denying the health effects of smoking (e.g., Lopipero et al., 2007). 
Among their many findings of advocacy bias, Lopipero et al. (2007) found that tobacco 
companies had administered public opinion surveys and only published results that supported 
their policy positions (p. 649). Another important body of research is narrative analysis where 
researchers identify patterns in written material that differently frame storylines depending on 
author affiliation (e.g., Jones, 2014; Olofsson, Weible, Heikkila, and Martel, 2017; Shanahan, 
Jones and McBeth, 2011). Interest groups tend to frame policy issues in ways that strengthen the 
interest groups’ own policy positions and villainize their opponents (Olofsson, Weible, Heikkila, 
and Martel, 2017; Shanahan, Jones and McBeth, 2011).  
A myriad of policy actors including researchers (e.g., Lstiburek, n.d.; Newsham, Mancini 
and Birt, 2009; Zuo and Zhao, 2014; Stephens, 2013; Scofield, 2009, 2013b) and news media 
(e.g., Navarro, 2009; Swearingen, 2014) have questioned whether LEED-certified green 
buildings consume more or less energy than conventional buildings, pointing at methodological 
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concerns with various extant studies that claim energy savings. For example, the debate is 
captured by physicist Dr. John Scofield in the American Physical Society magazine article:  
“But do LEED-certified buildings actually save primary energy and reduce GHG 
emission? LEED certification has clearly captured the public’s fancy–not unlike organic 
farming or herbal medicines. But also like these fields there is a woeful lack of scientific 
data supporting LEED’s efficacy. And what little measured building energy consumption 
data there are have been gathered through a “self-selected” process that is clearly 
biased towards the “better-performing” buildings. In these data, proponents find 
evidence that LEED-certification is saving energy. But careful analysis of even these 
biased data show that LEED-certified buildings, with regard to primary (or source) 
energy consumption and GHG emission, perform like other buildings–no better and no 
worse.”  
(Scofield, 2013a, italics mine)  
Similarly, Lstiburek (n.d.) with the Building Science Corporation criticized the methodological 
approach used by the efficient buildings advocacy group, the New Buildings Institute, in their 
study of LEED buildings, a study that was commissioned by the USGBC. After discussing issues 
with the matching technique used to pair buildings, Lstiburek (n.d.) writes,  
“Someone had to play with the numbers to make the storyline work and that is just plain 
misleading….So what does this mean? Let us translate—the LEED buildings did not 
conclusively save any energy compared to typical buildings built at the same time. This is 
not good. LEED needs to be fixed. Manipulating a bunch of statistics to hide behind does 
not save any real energy.”  
(Lstiburek (n.d.)) 
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Explicit in these statements are essentially accusations of advocacy bias; interest groups are 
being accused of releasing information that solely supports their favored program while failing to 
account for methodological concerns to make the study credible. In this line of reasoning, the 
following hypothesis is conceptualized: 
H1: Studies authored by individuals affiliated with environmental interest groups are 
likely to report higher energy savings from LEED-certified buildings programs compared 
to other authors. 
Interest Group Professionalism 
From the pluralist viewpoint, the political system is a competition between diverse 
interest groups attempting to influence government (Dahl, 1961; Martimort and Semenov, 2007). 
In the competitive environment, opposing interest groups provide information to policymakers, 
and the relative consistency of that information is desired so that the policymaker has some 
degree of confidence in the information, and in turn, in the interest group (Bertrand, Bombardini 
and Trebbi, 2014; Lopipero et al 2007; Krishna and Morgan, 2001). If interest groups are to 
present inconsistent information, or otherwise mislead a trusted policymaker, their credibility 
could be diminished. In this regard, the competitive nature of political environments may foster 
interest group professionalism stemming from the need to maintain credibility with policymakers 
and other stakeholders (Lohmann, 1995; Martimort and Semenov, 2007). This assumption 
embraces the viewpoint of interest groups positioning themselves to be influential in the decision 
making process over a long-term time horizon in a “repeated games” setting where their 
interactions occur more than once and possibly on a variety of policy issues (Potters and Winden, 
1992, p. 286).  
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Some political science literature on interest group behavior reflects the theory of interest 
group professionalism, resting on concepts of maintaining credibility and reputational interests 
(e.g., Berry and Wilcox, 2009; Hojnacki and Kimball, 1998). Credibility as a major asset in any 
political environment raises the possibility that information provided to policymakers by interest 
groups is constructed to be an accurate representation of a policy issue, albeit from the viewpoint 
of the interest group (Ainsworth, 2010; Berry and Wilcox, 2009, p. 103; Lopipero et al., 2007, p. 
638-639; Potters and Winden, 1992, p. 286). More commonly, the political science field 
intrinsically embraces the polarization of ideologies and the resulting biases in information 
sharing (Contandriopoulos, et al., 2007), however some literature emphasizes the expertise of 
interest groups and their lobbyists and minimizes the discussion of informational biases. The 
notion that information shared by interest groups is not biased can be treated as the null 
hypothesis (e.g., Bertrand, Bombardini and Trebbi, 2014).  
H2: Studies authored by individuals affiliated with interest groups are not likely to report 
statistically distinctive energy savings from LEED-certified buildings programs 
compared to other authors. 
Background on the LEED program 
The eco-labelling and design standards program initiated by the U.S. Green Building 
Council (USGBC), Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) began in 2000.  
LEED has become a worldwide model program with a presence in over 160 countries and over 
30,000 certified project worldwide (Shutters and Tufts, 2016). The certification program has four 
levels of stringency: Certified, Silver, Gold and Platinum. Building professionals who are 
seeking certification for the project can select from a variety of points from categories including 
energy, water, land use, transportation, indoor air quality and materials.  
 99 
Until 2016, projects were not required to meet minimum energy efficiency requirements, 
other than the local building codes, but rather had to comply with minimum point requirements 
across multiple categories in order to be eligible for certification (USGBC, 2018b). This has 
caused a point of contention among the building community who wanted assurance that LEED 
buildings would use less energy than conventional buildings (e.g., Stephens, 2013). With recent 
program changes in 2016, now projects must meet minimum energy savings thresholds that 
depend on the type of project, or the project can qualify under an “above-code” prescriptive path 
that defines requirements beyond the minimum building standards (USGBC, 2018b). These 
characteristics of the green building policy domain create an ideal case selection to test advocacy 
bias and interest group professionalism, given that LEED policies have been diffusing worldwide 
yet the environmental outcomes from the program are still questionable. Mainly the critics are 
pointing to concerns with program design regarding minimum program requirements as well as 
concerns with biases in LEED research studies.  
Research Design 
This study uses a regression-based meta-analysis method to explore how authors who are 
affiliated with various organized groups or institutions report on energy savings from LEED 
buildings. Meta-regression methodologies have been prominent in fields that commonly use 
experimental research designs, such as medicine, because these studies tend to be more easily 
comparable relative to social sciences that use a myriad of analytical approaches (Ringquist, 
2005, p. 224). More recently, the quantity of meta-regression studies has increased in the social 
sciences (Nelson and Kennedy, 2009), including public policy and public management, as new 
tools and techniques have become available (Ringquist, 2013). The benefits of meta-analysis 
methodologies is the ability to generate parameter estimates for variables of interest and to use 
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tools to generalize statistical estimations across studies that use different methodologies and 
analytical approaches (Ringquist, 2013).  
The effect size is the critical interest in a meta-regression study. Effect sizes are 
“standardized measures of the relationship between the focal predictor and the dependent 
variable in original studies” (Ringquist, 2013, p. 18), such as environmental regulation as the 
focal predictor and business location as the dependent variable (Jeppesen, List and Folmer, 2002) 
or income as the focal predictor and demand for water as the dependent variable (Dalhuisen, 
Florax and Rietveld, 2003). The intent of meta-regression studies is to estimate the effect size of 
a given phenomenon by combining models from a set of research studies. The approach to 
standardize the data depends on the type of statistical methods in original studies (e.g., 
regression, difference of means, etc.) and expectations of the data and relationships between 
variables. 
Case Selection 
The case selection includes all publically available studies on LEED-certified buildings 
obtained via a systematic review of extent literature (peer-reviewed and non-peer-reviewed), 
similar to methods used in other buildings-related energy efficiency meta-analyses (Delmas  et 
al., 2013; Ankamah-Yeboah and Rehdanz, 2014). I searched the Google Scholar database using 
the following search settings: 1991-2018; keywords with Boolean operators: “energy use” AND 
“buildings” AND “Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design”, retrieving 980 articles. I 
previously searched the EBSCO Host and Web of Science databases for the pilot study, 
retrieving 593 articles. For each paper that was retrieved in the initial sweep, I also downloaded 
“recommended” or “relevant” articles generated by the database during the article retrieval 
process. I assessed each article based on title and eliminated the article if the title explicitly states 
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a focus on residential buildings or transportation, or some other unrelated topic, retaining only 
articles on relevant building types such as commercial and industrial buildings, resulting in 247 
articles (Phase 1 in Table 5-2; see also Appendix Table 1: Codebook). Next, I read abstracts to 
determine if the paper is an empirical evaluation of the LEED program (Phase 2). Last, I 
evaluated each article to determine if the study estimates impacts of LEED construction on 
building energy use, resulting in a final sample of 22 articles (Final Phase). 
[Insert Table 5-2 Here] 
The sample size for this study is 22 unique articles containing 164 statistical models 
(Table 5-3). This study’s sample size is comparable to other regression-based meta-analyses in 
education, agriculture, and water policy studies (e.g., Furnée, Groot, and van Den Brink, 2008; 
Bel, Fageda and Warner, 2012; Carvalho, Marques and Berg, 2012). For example, Furnée, Groot 
and van Den Brink, H. M. (2008) includes 35 studies with 64 statistical models in the first meta-
regression model and 10 studies with 24 statistical models in the second meta-regression model. 
Bel, Fageda and Warner (2012) include 27 studies with 46 statistical models in the meta-
regression. Carvalho, Marques and Berg (2012) include 35 studies in one meta-regression model 
and 13 studies in the other meta-regression model.  
[Insert Table 5-3 Here] 
The studies in the sample range from having only 1 LEED building to up to 254 LEED 
buildings in their difference of means models. Energy evaluations on LEED buildings are 
commonly undertaken in the architecture and engineering disciplines seeking to understand 
building performance - such as energy or water use intensity - of a small selection of buildings 
rather than reaching the broader goal of generalizing how much energy we can expect to save 
when building to LEED standards. Consequently, the population of LEED studies tend to suffer 
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from very low sample sizes when considering the effect size from a statistical perspective rather 
than a building design perspective. This study attempts to aggregate results from the sample of 
LEED studies in order to discern an effect size estimate, in terms of Energy Use Intensity, across 
published studies.  
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable is the percent change in energy use, representing the difference 
between the Energy Use Intensity (EUI) of LEED buildings compared to non-LEED buildings 
(Table 5-4). EUI is a common unit used when researchers normalize different fuel uses into one 
unit of energy, operationalized as energy per square foot per year (U.S. EPA, 2016). Analysts 
often use basic estimations to measure energy impacts for sustainability and energy planning 
purposes (Patton and Sawicki, 1986). For building energy consumption analysis, the following 
calculation is adapted from the EPA’s recommendation:  
𝑦$%$&'(	*+,-%'* = ( 𝑋*123$45	 − 𝑋2+*$7-%$ 	𝑥	100) 
where 𝑦$%$&'(	*+,-%'* is the impact of the program on energy consumption , 𝑋*123$45	 is the 
energy usage of the LEED buildings, and 𝑋2+*$7-%$ is the energy usage of baseline buildings that 
are not built to LEED standards (U.S. EPA, 2015). A convention in the energy efficiency 
program field is to report results in terms of percentage of energy savings. The formula is more 
basic than those used at the facility or building component level in engineering studies, which 
commonly use the International Measurement and Verification Protocol (Efficiency Valuation 
Organization, 2014) or ASHRAE Guideline 14 (ASHRAE, 2014), or other formulas for 
measuring impacts of a program on building energy consumption (Navigant Consulting, Inc. and 
Steven Winter Associates, 2015).  
[Insert Table 5-4 Here] 
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Focal Predictor 
From the perspective that persuasion towards favored policy positions is reflected in the 
published studies, the authors’ affiliation becomes important. Author affiliation is the variable 
that represents the organizational affiliation of the study’s primary author. I identified the authors 
affiliation in the journal articles’ corresponding information about the authors, such as 
“University of X”, or a name of a nonprofit organization. Authors are affiliated with 
environmental non-governmental organizations, government agencies or academic institutions. 
Each primary author is assigned to a category and coded as a factor variable. Table 5-5 shows 
descriptive statistics for all independent variables. Notably, none of the studies have businesses 
as the primary author and only one study has an environmental primary author affiliation.   
[Insert Table 5-5 Here] 
Controls  
Multiple factors are expected to impact the building’s energy use that is reported, 
including the method for measuring energy use, the type of energy that is analyzed, the building 
use type (e.g., hospital, data center, office building), and the number of buildings in the model.  
Measurement method: modelling simulation or field testing.  Some studies directly 
measure energy savings, while others estimate the savings using simulation. This is an important 
potential difference in the studies included in this research and could account for patterns in the 
dependent variable. A dichotomous variable indicating if the study uses modeling simulations or 
field testing is included in the statistical models. 
Before a building is constructed, the engineer typically runs modeling simulations to 
estimate the energy consumption based on specifications of the building components. This 
information is compared to a baseline building constructed to model building codes which are 
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minimum building standards with less efficient building system specifications, such as higher 
solar heat gain coefficients on the windows and lower energy efficiency ratings on the furnace. 
The difference between annual energy usage of the two buildings is the percent difference 
expected to be achieved by building to higher standards. 
After the building is constructed, post-occupancy energy consumption data is available. 
However, LEED, as well as building codes, has not historically required post-occupancy energy 
consumption data to verify that the building is performing as it was designed. Some studies, 
however, are conducted using “field testing” methods, which analyze post-occupancy energy 
consumption data. In these cases, the energy consumption data is once again compared to some 
set of “baseline” buildings. Rather than a single building constructed to minimum building codes 
as the baseline like the method used in modeling simulations, researchers commonly use the 
Commercial Building Energy Consumption Survey (CBECS), a national dataset with energy 
consumption data for various building types as a way to compare energy usage in code-built 
buildings and LEED buildings.  
 The uncertainty and inconsistencies around modelling simulations and field testing could 
account for variation in the dependent variable. For example, Stoppel and Leite (2013) found that 
the modelling simulation over-predicted building energy use for two buildings by 14percent and 
25percent. Schwartz and Raslan (2013) found that the use of particular simulation tool or 
statistical model used to estimate energy consumption significantly affected the energy 
estimations.  There are many building scientists working to improve modeling simulations as 
well as people working to require post-occupancy evaluations in programs and building codes. 
The future outlook for this area of building science is promising, but for now these issues are 
likely to account for energy consumption discrepancies between studies. 
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Type of energy unit: site or source. The type of energy unit evaluated in the studies is 
also expected to explain some variation in the dependent variable (Scofield 2013b). Site energy 
is the amount of energy used by the building, seen as units of energy consumption on utility bills. 
Source energy is the true amount used by the building including the energy needed for 
generation, transmission, and production, i.e. the energy “losses” than never actually get to the 
building but instead get lost along the way. The EPA recommends using source energy units 
rather than site energy units in building analytics because it more accurately represents how 
much energy a building uses, accounting for the particular energy mix for the building since each 
fuel type has unique losses associated with it (EPA, 2016). Scofield (2013b) re-ran variations of 
the models that New Buildings Institute (2008) and Newsham, Mancini and Birt (2009) had 
produced, and found significantly less energy savings when source energy is calculated rather 
than site energy. Site energy is more commonly analyzed in building energy efficiency studies 
because site energy is reported on statements provided by utility companies so it is the easiest 
type of data for a consumer to obtain. Conversions between site and source energy can be done 
using the technical reference guide provided by the EPA through the Portfolio Manager program 
(EPA, 2018).  
Building use type. Buildings perform differently based on how they are used. Some 
building use types, such as hospitals, data centers, and laboratories tend to use significantly more 
energy than other building use types, such as fire and police stations. Ideally, the number of 
observations in this study would be enough to dummy code each building use type. Given the 
small sample size of studies, buildings are grouped into three categories: 1) high energy building 
use types (hospitals, data centers, and laboratories), 2) building use types most affected by 
occupant behavior (office buildings), and 3) other building use types. 
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Number of buildings in the model. A common metric added to meta-regression models is 
the number of observations or degrees of freedom in the original study (Nelson and Kennedy, 
2009; Ringquist, 2013). This construct is typically intended to address publication bias where 
peer-reviewed journals often prefer articles with statistically significant models and variables. 
Across the sample of LEED studies included in this study, the number of LEED buildings ranges 
from 1 building to 254 buildings.   
[Insert Table 5-5 Here] 
Data Analysis 
First, I will address some problems associated with meta-regression modelling, including 
primary data heterogeneity, heteroscedasticity, and correlation caused when one study presents 
multiple analytical models (Nelson and Kennedy, 2009). Regarding heterogeneity, the dependent 
variable in the studies must represent the same construct across studies and the data cannot be so 
widely dispersed that the units are not on a single scale. Because this research is examining the 
effects of a program, variation in the dependent variable is highly likely.  To get a sense of the 
variation between LEED and non-LEED buildings overall across the studies, I conducted a 
paired t-test on the means of site EUI of LEED and non-LEED buildings (Table 5-6). In many of 
the studies, the researchers used matching techniques to pair a set of baseline buildings to a 
LEED building. Using the paired t-test, each set of baseline and subject buildings are treated as a 
pair.  The mean difference of site energy use of -14.16 percent rejects the null hypothesis that 
H0:  μ ≠ μ 0, or the mean of the two groups is the same. This means that LEED buildings use less 
site energy overall. The upper and lower bounds of the 95 percent confidence interval are -26 
percent and -2 percent, respectively, giving confidence that energy consumption for LEED 
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buildings is less than non-LEED buildings overall. The t-ratio (2.36), representing the mean 
difference between the LEED and non-LEED buildings divided by the standard errors, indicates 
statistically significant differences between LEED and non-LEED buildings. 
[Insert Table 5-6 Here] 
To look deeper at the data, I created a boxplot to show the distribution of site and source 
EUI (Figure 5-1). The bottom and top of the boxes are the first and third quartiles, while the line 
in the middle represents the second quartile, or median. The median EUIs for the LEED 
buildings are visibly lower than non-LEED buildings. The whiskers represent the interquartile 
range (IQR) depicting the difference between the upper and lower quartiles of the data. The dots 
represent outliers. The source EUI boxplots have clear outliers while the site EUI is more evenly 
dispersed.  
[Insert Figure 5-1 Here] 
Because of the outliers shown in Figure 5-1, I created a second boxplot to identify if certain 
building types were chiefly responsible for the outlier data points, as outliers could over or 
underestimate the effect size (Figure 5-2). The most extreme data points are multi-family 
residential (which are considered commercial buildings in building codes and standards) and 
recreation building use types. 
[Insert Figure 5-2 Here] 
Next, I visualized the data in a scatterplot where the x-axis is percent change in site EUI 
and y-axis is the number of buildings in the study (Figure 5-3). The intent of the scatterplot is to 
help assess if models with single buildings or many buildings are showing the greatest or least 
change in energy use, as multiple techniques are used to mitigate such issues, such as weighting 
the model by number of observations in the original studies’ model, or taking the mean effect 
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size of all models per study (Nelson and Kennedy, 2009; Ringquist, 2013). The scatterplot shows 
that models with higher numbers of buildings are more scattered around 0 and models with one 
or very few buildings are widely dispersed along the x-axis. The positive and negative outliers 
are models of single buildings. This suggests that the number of buildings in the models are 
likely to have an effect on the dependent variable so a variable for the number of buildings is 
included in the model. As expected, most models reported decreases in site EUI for LEED 
buildings, but some models reported increases. To meet the assumptions of linear regression, I 
dealt with outliers in the dependent variable by capping the values at the 5th and 95th percentile.    
[Insert Figure 5-3 Here] 
Meta-regression Modelling Results 
 Using the R program for statistical computing, I produce a generalized linear regression 
model to estimate the effects of organized interests on reported energy savings while controlling 
for important study characteristics. I use the Metafor package, intended exclusively for meta-
regression studies (Viechtbauer, 2010). The model uses standardized mean differences in energy 
consumption in LEED and non-LEED buildings as the dependent variable. The impact of each 
variable is the difference between the coefficient and intercept, or mean value of Y and reference 
category for the primary author factor variable, when all independent variables are equal to zero. 
The intercept is -29 percent change in energy use between LEED and non-LEED 
buildings with “Government” author affiliation as the reference category (Table 5-7). Studies 
authored by an environmental organization report the highest mean energy reduction (-45.95 
percent) of all the primary author categories when all other independent variables are equal to 
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zero. Studies with a primary author that has a university affiliation reports the least energy 
reductions in LEED buildings (-14.60 percent, adding the university coefficient to the intercept).  
[Insert Table 5-7 Here] 
These results support the advocacy bias hypothesis suggesting that the environmental 
organization will report higher energy savings than authors affiliated with government agencies 
or universities. Looking closer at the distribution of reported energy savings by primary author 
category, it is clear studies with the environmental author affiliation mostly reports energy 
reductions, not energy increases, while the government and university affiliations report a wider 
distribution of energy consumption patterns (Figure 5-4). Studies with universities as the primary 
author affiliation especially have a high number of statistical models that find that LEED 
buildings use more energy than non-LEED buildings. 
[Insert Figure 5-4 Here] 
The measurement approach in terms of modeling simulations or field testing was 
expected to have an effect on the reported energy savings, as modeling simulations are 
notoriously inaccurate and field testing using actual energy bill data is more accurate. However, 
the lack of statistical significance suggests that the measurement approach is less clear-cut than 
expected (p=0.29). Overall, field measurements are expected to report -10.54 less energy 
consumption than modeling simulations. Considering that field measurements are considered to 
be more accurate, this finding suggests that, generally speaking, LEED buildings are using less 
energy when field tested than the modeling simulations are projecting.   
 Other control variables are intended to help fit the model. While the building use types 
variables are not statistically significant, there is apparent variation between office buildings (-
3.82), high energy use buildings (10.00), and recreation buildings (19.47). This variation is 
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explained by dramatic differences in building uses, which inherently relate to occupancy factors, 
set point temperatures, plug loads, and architectural designs such as glazing and other building 
penetrations that cause heat loss. In an attempt to estimate the impact of author affiliation, these 
variables are merely used as controls to help fit the model.  
Another control is the number of LEED buildings in the original study, which is varied 
across studies. Studies range from having 1 to 254 LEED buildings. This variable turned out to 
be statistically significant. Studies with more observations are more likely to report higher 
energy savings. For every additional building in the model in the original studies, the model 
estimates -0.21 decrease in energy savings. This is intended to address the nature of the LEED 
studies, commonly coming from engineering and architecture disciplines where single buildings 
are analyzed in detail rather than the researcher examining many buildings and aiming for 
generalizability of research findings.   
Limitations 
Much of the backlash about reported energy savings from the LEED program has been 
directed at the study by the New Buildings Institute (Turner and Frankel, 2008) that was 
commissioned by the U.S. Green Building Council. I had expected to find additional LEED 
studies published by environmental organizations, but through the search method that I 
employed, only the NBI study has an environmental group as the primary author with 22 
statistical models in that study. One other study – Diamond, Opitz, Hicks, Neida, and Herrera 
(2006) - has environmental representation but the primary author is from a government agency. 
Two options to circumvent the low sample of environmental authors are possible: 1) I could 
change the way that I construct the dependent variable so that the environmental authors on the 
Diamond et al. (2006) study are represented in the model, or 2) I could alter the literature search 
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strategy, such as search the USGBC website for case study research. However, in reviewing 
blogs and articles capturing the debate about LEED energy savings, the NBI study is commonly 
referenced so it is possible that the meta-regression model is robust enough with just that study 
as the environmental primary author to adequately represent this particular scenario. Subsequent 
research could test the advocacy bias and interest group professionalism hypotheses in a different 
scenario to see if the results are comparable to findings from this study. 
This research suffers from omitted variable bias in two ways. Ideally, a control variable 
would be included for the LEED program version/level, but this information was not conveyed 
in enough of the original studies to be included in the statistical models.  Since LEEDs inception 
in 2000, there have been four versions of the rating system - v1 pilot version in 2000, v2 in 2005, 
v3 in 2009, v4 in 2013 - and four certification levels - Certified, Silver, Gold and Platinum. It is 
likely that energy consumption varies by LEED version due to changes in program requirements 
and LEED certification level due to the increased amount of points required for the higher 
certification levels.  
Secondly, occupancy factors show the most unexplained effect on building energy use 
overall (Heidarinejad et al., 2014; Hsu, 2014; Kaddory Al-Zubaidy, 2015; Ryan and Sanquist, 
2012). In a cluster analysis using energy simulations of LEED office buildings, Heidarinejad, 
Dahlhausen, Mahon, Pyke, and Srebric (2014) find that unregulated process loads, such as server 
equipment and plug loads, account for the majority of variation between office building clusters. 
Occupant factors have been historically difficult to model due to lack of data on the actual 
number of building occupants, how many hours they are in the building, their comfort levels in 
regards to indoor temperature, and their plug loads (computers, desk lamps, etc.) (Ryan and 
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Sanquist, 2012). These factors are cited as a critical missing link to predicting building 
performance (Hsu, 2014; Kaddory Al-Zubaidy, 2015).  
Discussion and Conclusion 
Game theory explains motivations for interest groups to present biased policy 
information, and scenarios under which this situation is expected to occur, such as in the 
presence of oppositional groups that may present incongruous information. This is an 
information asymmetry problem between policymakers and interest groups where interest groups 
might engage in strategic issue framing and produce empirical information that advances their 
policy positions. Advocacy bias supposes that information from interest groups is “hopelessly 
biased,” as Ainsworth (2010) suggests. Alternatively, interest groups may approach empirical 
results more objectively regardless of what the findings suggest for their policy position because 
they seek to maintain a professional reputation and credibility is needed to gain trust from a 
policymaker. Information sharing occurs in a repeated games environment where interest groups 
have long-term relationships with policymakers.  
This research examines these two competing views of interest groups, advocacy bias and 
interest group professionalism, in an often neglected type of policy domain – highly technical 
and low salience. In the case of LEED buildings, one report in particular became the subject of 
an advocacy bias debate, with concerns raised on building selection, statistical methods, and 
analysis of site energy rather than source energy (see quotations in Theory section). The 2008 
New Buildings Institute study was a key piece of information, cited in much of the subsequent 
work that questioned whether LEED buildings save energy. In addition, program critique of no 
minimum energy requirements beyond the building codes has fueled much of the debate on 
uncertainty of energy savings from LEED buildings, a program specification that has recently 
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been changed to require minimum above-code energy standards. I did not expect that the NBI 
study would be the only study found with an environmental organization as the primary author. 
This could be due to the academic database search rather than a more comprehensive web engine 
search. Even still, the 22 models in the NBI study provide evidence for advocacy bias with the at 
least 15 percent higher energy savings reported overall. I found that reports authored by 
individuals associated with an environmental organization systematically reports higher energy 
savings than academic authors or government agencies based on a total sample size of 164 
statistical models. It is reasonable to think that patterns observed here, where the stakes may be 
lower and less conflict ridden, will be magnified in other areas. 
Policy Implications 
A consequence of advocacy bias is that it could undermine program designs and the 
reputation and credibility of program designers. Particularly this occurs when different interest 
groups present incongruous information to policymakers and stakeholders (Lopipero et al., 
2007), which has been happening in the case of the LEED program. Policymakers and program 
participants have expectations about results that will be achieved by adopting or participating in 
a program. The expected results are commonly set forth by technical analyses of building energy 
consumption. While architecture and engineering studies on energy consumption are useful in 
understanding LEED program impacts, meta-regression methods account for systematic 
variation across studies, lending insights into how and why inconsistent information about the 
LEED program is being shared. Understanding systematic variation in technical analyses helps 
to inform discussions on program effectiveness and if programs should be continued, modified or 
expired. The recent modification to LEED which requires minimum energy requirements is 
expected to help assure policymakers that LEED buildings will save energy. 
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Tables and Figures 
Table 5-1. Hypotheses 
Model Typology Direction Core Concept 
Advocacy Bias  Negative Interest groups have strategic incentives to 
release or withhold information.  
Interest Group 
Professionalism 
No Effect Interest groups need to maintain a positive 




Table 5-2. Articles Retrieved by Database 







EBSCO Host 361 articles 50 articles 18 articles 4 articles 
Web of Science 
SciScience 
232 articles 42 articles 8 articles 3 articles 
Google Scholar 980 articles 155 articles 64 articles 15 articles 




Table 5-3. Studies Used in this Analysis 
Author 
Number of 




in the Study 
Affiliation of 
Primary Author 
Turner and Frankel 22 121 Environmental 
Menassa, Mangasarian et al 22 22 University 
Oates and Sullivan 19 25 University 
Diamond, Opitz, Hicks et al 18 18 Government 
Scofield 16 31 University 
Newsham, Mancini and Birt 16 98 Government 
Fowler et al 16 16 Government 
Chen, Lee and Wang 9 3 University 
Scofield and Doane 6 84 University 
Xu, Huang, Jin et al 2 2 Government 
Stoppel and Leite 2 2 University 
Sabapathy, Ragavan et al 2 4 University 
Kern, Antoniolli, Wander et al 2 2 University 
Issa, Attalla, Rankin, and Christian 2 3 University 
Deru and Torcellini 2 2 Government 
Agdas, Srinivasan, Frost et al 2 10 University 
Thiel, Needy, Ries, Hupp et al 1 1 University 
Michael, Zhang and Xia 1	 1 University 
Li, Hong and Yan 1 1 Government 
Hong, Yang, Hill, and Feng 1 1 Government 
Attia 1 1 University 
Asensio and Delmas 1 254 University 
N (Observations) 164 702  
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Table 5-4. Variables and Descriptions 
Variable Description  
Dependent Variable 
Percent change in 
energy use intensity  
Measured by comparing the EUI of LEED buildings to non-LEED 
buildings. The data is reported in original studies. 
Interest Groups (Focal Predictor) 
Primary author 
affiliation 
Categorical variable for university, environmental NGO or 
government agency. Data is collected from journal articles’ 
information about the corresponding author.  
Study Characteristics (Control Variables) 
Type of energy unit Dichotomous variable for site or source energy 
Building use type Categorical variable for high energy building use types (data 
centers, laboratories, hospitals), building types greatly affected by 
occupant behavior (office), and other building types. 
Measurement method Dichotomous variable for field observation or modeling simulation 




Table 5-5. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Min.    Mean    Max.    
Year 2005 2011 2018 
Primary Author: University 0 0.52 1 
Primary Author: Environmental Interest Group 0 0.13 1 
Primary Author: Government Agency 0 0.34 1 
Field Measurement 0 0.85 1 
Modeling Simulations 0 0.15 1 
Uses CBECS as Baseline 0 0.46 1 
# of LEED Buildings 1 13.29 254 
United States 0 0.90 1 
Office Building 0 0.46 1 
High Energy Building Use Types 0 0.29 1 





Table 5-6. Paired T-test of Site Energy Use Intensity for LEED and Baseline Buildings 
Variable Obs Mean (kBTU/square foot) Std. Err. 
Site EUI for LEED Buildings 127 106.4 7.33 
Site EUI for non-LEED Buildings 127 120.6 8.50 
Difference 127 -14.16 1.18 
t = 2.36    




Figure 5-1. Box plot of Energy Use Intensity for LEED and Baseline Buildings (n=164) 
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Figure 5-3. Scatterplot of Energy Use Intensity by Number of Buildings (n=164)  
  





























Table 5-7. Meta-regression Model 
 Dependent variable: 
 Percent Change in Energy Use 
Intercept -29.09***       (11.07) 
Primary Author: Environmental -16.85*       (9.72) 
Primary Author: University 14.49**       (6.41) 
Field Measurement -10.54       (10.00) 
Compares to CBECS 4.80       (6.17) 
Office Buildings -3.82       (6.14) 
High Energy Use Buildings 10.00       (10.84) 
Recreation Buildings 19.47       (15.60) 
United States 28.43**       (11.56) 
Number of LEED Buildings -0.21**       (0.10) 
Observations 164  
Log Likelihood -804.91  
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1631.81  
R2 10.92%  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Figure 5-4. Reported Energy Use by Primary Author Affiliation 
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Chapter 6 Conclusion and Lessons Learned 
My intent with this dissertation research is to discern if business interest group 
involvement in urban sustainability policymaking increases or decreases the likelihood of policy 
adoption. Extent research finds inconsistent effects that business interest groups have on urban 
sustainability policy; both positive and negative effects are found with varying magnitude. 
Attempting to understand why effects are so varied, the overarching research question for the 
dissertation is Under what conditions do business interest groups increase or decrease the 
likelihood of policy adoption?  
Urban sustainability research generally covers many activities within a community, such 
as transportation, buildings, waste, water and more. In order to understand business interest 
group dynamics, I deeply explore one issue area – the buildings sector. My reasoning is that the 
sustainability field to too broad to generalize the effects of interest groups across the various sub-
sectors of urban sustainability as each sub-sector has distinctive interest groups with different 
motivations, policy preferences, power, influence, access to policymakers and resources.  
The first contribution that this dissertation makes to the urban sustainability field is 
sector-specific research to reveal nuances of interest group dynamics within a single issue 
domain using common urban sustainability theories and methods that explain what influences 
policy adoption. While sector-specific research is widely available, it rarely makes an explicit tie 
to urban sustainability theory.  
The second contribution is how I am operationalizing business interest groups. I segment 
the construction industry into what I call ‘traditional’ and ‘green’ categories in an attempt to 
distinguish divergent policy preferences within the construction industry and how they 
differently effect policy adoption. The only other article that I found that does this is Jenner et al 
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(2012) in the Energy Journal examining the effects of renewable and nuclear energy industry 
associations on the adoption of Renewable Portfolio Standards. Most extent research treats 
business interest groups as one homogeneous category, but that does not seem accurate because 
within a single industrial group there is so much variation in motivations, policy preferences, and 
market segments. For example, some homebuilders are traditional and conservative and 
generally oppose building regulations while others are innovative and supportive of green 
building.  I wanted to see if I could segment the construction industry into these distinctive 
categories to explain conditions under which types of business interest groups support or oppose 
building regulations. Portney and Berry (2016) had a similar goal, but their approach was to 
administer surveys to 50 cities to identify various types of interests that participate: HOAs, 
developers, environmental groups, chambers, etc. While their goal was similar, their approach 
was different from my approach to look within a single interest group category. I find that 
distinctive segments of business interest groups for the construction industry have 
distinguishable effects on policy adoption. Traditional industry associations tend to limit the 
probability of sustainability policy adoption for the buildings sector while ‘green’ industry 
associations tend to increase the likelihood of adoption. Interest group segmentation of an 
industrial category can help to explain the nuanced effects that sub-groups have on policy 
adoption.  
Another contribution is considering policy scope and the target population. May and 
Koski (2007) explain that the typical behavior of firms to oppose environmental regulation does 
not necessarily apply to green building policies because they are most often aimed at public 
buildings. I built on that proposition by testing two different case selections – building codes 
aimed at private buildings and green building programs that have historically been aimed at 
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public buildings – to see how the effects differ depending on the policy scope and the target 
population. I find that the effects of interest groups are mediated by the type of policy that is 
considered. The type of policy (e.g., applies to public or privately-owned buildings) determines 
the impacts of cost burdens to the construction industry and the level of involvement of the 
builder segment in the specific market affected by the policy. 
Throughout the research I emphasize that this is a low salience policy issue. Interest 
group theories are generally developed while studying high salience issue areas, so I emphasize 
how interest group theories apply in a low salience issue area that attracts technical experts more 
so that citizen groups, which I think is relevant to many of the technical aspects of sustainability.  
The final contribution is methodological. City-level data collection is notoriously 
difficult, which is probably why researchers have used proxies to measure interest group activity 
rather than more directly measuring interest group presence. In this research, I use Python for 
web scraping to construct the variable for interest group presence as counts of interest group 
members per city. This is an alternative method rather than using a national data source or 
surveys to construct the interest group variable which is the more common approach in policy 
studies. I find that the algorithmic data collection process is most robust and manageable where 
member information is centralized in a common directory, such as the case with the Building 
Owners and Managers Association (BOMA). Contrastingly, where member lists are 
decentralized on regional association chapter websites, such as the National Association of 
Home Builders (NAHB), a generalized algorithm is required, yet difficult to execute given the 
variability in website design and programming syntax (e.g., HTML tags). Even still, an 
algorithmic data collection process is relatively comprehensive, efficient and replicable 
compared to many other data collection process, such as survey administration.  
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Regarding lessons learned, perhaps the single traditional industry association, BOMA, 
represented in Chapter 4 does not have as much of an effect than was thought despite BOMA’s 
explicit oppositional policy statement (see p. 70), and other industry groups may have more 
effect. This is a limitation of the dissertation; it only examines three organizations involved in the 
buildings policy domain, but many more organizations are actually involved. For example, an 
article by Emily Badger (2013), “Why are some states trying to ban LEED green building 
standards?”, points to the American High-Performance Buildings Coalition as an industry-led 
coalition of 42 organizations that formally oppose LEED on some grounds. The Coalition 
supports “reasonable performance based policies” and “voluntary adoption” similar to BOMA’s 
green building policy position statement. A subsequent study could model the sums of members 
in the 42 industry groups in addition to BOMA members for an estimation of their effects on 
mandatory green building policy adoption at the local level. However, data collection could be 
resource intensive. While algorithmic data collection provides efficiencies, the ability to 
algorithmically collect data depends on the structure of web data and design and security of the 
website. The availability of an Application Programming Interface (API), such as the API for 
Census data, makes algorithmic data collection easy, secure, reliable and replicable, but a lot of 
good data does not yet have an API. 
In Chapter 5, the central pillar of the advocacy bias theory is that interest groups 
construct information that supports their policy position or negates oppositional positions. 
Framing interest group professionalism which involves trust and credibility with policymakers as 
a duality with advocacy bias may have been wrongly assumed because, similar to interest 
groups, policymakers also have policy positions that they support and therefore may equally seek 
information that supports their positions and negates oppositional positional positions. It may 
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actually be beneficial to policymakers to align with interest groups who strategically over- or 
under-estimate program impacts in their favor. This insight affects the theoretical foundation of 
Chapter 5, but not the statistical model. Considering policymakers’ preferences has a more 
central role in game theory modeling than the meta-regression approach pursued here.  
In summary, my research is situated within urban sustainability literature. It contributes 
to understanding interest group dynamics at the city-level in a low salience policy domain 
attracting technical experts with minimal public attention or citizen involvement. I use a novel 
approach to examining the effects of interest groups by segmenting a single industrial category to 
better understand how divergent policy preferences differently effect policy adoption. For a 
methodological contribution, I use Python for algorithmic data collection to overcome the 
difficulties associated with quantitative research at the city-level.  
